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ABSTRACT
The nuclear power industry has long recognized that reducing its costs is essential
for nuclear power to remain competitive with other power sources such as coal, oil and
natural gas. It is well known that the economic performance of nuclear power is enhanced
by improving the plant capacity factor. The plant capacity factor is defined as the ratio of
actual electric power produced to the theoretical electric power which could have been
produced over a given period. The principal ways to improve the capacity factor are
increasing the cycle length between refuelings, reducing forced outages, and reducing the
length of planned outages. In this report, the first two strategies are explored.
One of the hurdles that the nuclear power industry must clear in order to provide a
longer operational cycle concerns the intervals of all maintenance and testing activities,
called surveillances, which are currently performed off-line at intervals less than the cycle
length goal. These surveillance must be performed at extended intervals or performed on-
line. If the surveillance intervals are extended, some negative effects may result. The
safety of the plant may be reduced and the expected forced outage length may increase.
These potential negative effects must be offset to justify achieving a higher capacity factor.
A methodology to quantitatively rationalize the surveillance interval extension is
developed. The economic and safety requirements, which are consistent with a longer
operational cycle, are established. The strategy is described and the data requirement for
the analysis is specified. The output of this methodology is the most cost-effective
combination of improvements of the components to fulfill the economic/safety requirements
associated with a longer operational cycle. Available failure data sources are thoroughly
explored and a standard failure data analysis method is proposed. Finally, the surveillance
interval extension methodology is applied to a set of components as a demonstration of its
use. Methods for prospective improvements of the repair time and reliability of selected
components are proposed based upon interviews with experts.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Michael W. Golay
Title: Professor of Nuclear Engineering
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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1. Impetus
The nuclear power industry has long recognized that reducing its costs is essential
for nuclear power to remain competitive with other power sources such as coal, oil and
natural gas. Currently, these fossil fuel plants have an economic advantage over nuclear
plants in the US. This is because conventional fossil fuel plants have lower capital costs
and lower operation and maintenance (O&M) costs. The only economic advantage nuclear
plants have is lower fuel costs.
It is well known that the economic performance of nuclear power is enhanced by
improving the plant capacity factor, thereby apportioning non-fuel expenses over a large
amount of electric energy product. The plant capacity factor is defined as the ratio of actual
electric power produced to the theoretical electric power which could have been produced
over a given period. The principal ways to improve the capacity factor are increasing the
cycle length between refuelings, reducing forced outages, and reducing the length of
planned outages. This report focuses upon the first two of these, increasing the operational
cycle length and reducing forced outages.
A net economic benefit can result if the core fuel costs associated with a longer
refueling interval can be sufficiently offset by the reduced frequency of refueling
shutdowns and by reliable operation throughout the longer cycle operating duration.
Although some utilities have already extended their operating cycles to 24 months, longer
operational cycles such as 48 months may offer more economic advantages.
However, the nuclear power industry must clear some hurdles in order to provide
longer operational cycles. First, a fuel core must be designed which is capable of a longer
lifetime. Second, a strategy for attaining higher plant levels of reliability and availability
must be formulated to make a longer cycle attractive. Third, all maintenance and testing
activities, called surveillances, which are currently performed off-line at intervals less than
the longer cycle goal must be performed at extended intervals or performed on-line.
The latter two compete with each other. If the surveillances are performed on-line
or their intervals are extended, this change may have a negative effect upon the system
reliability. Accordingly, the forced outage length may increase and the safety of the plant
may be reduced. Therefore, to achieve a higher capacity factor, these potential negative
effects must be offset somehow. A conceptual diagram showing how to achieve a higher
capacity factor is shown in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1. Conceptual Diagram for Achieving Higher Capacity Factor
Strategies Outcomes
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Increasing Reducing Forced
System Reliability Outage Length
An approach to the surveillance problem was developed by Maurer, Moore,
Mchenry, and Todreas (1996)1. In this study, all regulatory based and investment
protection surveillances which currently preclude a 48-month operational cycle at a typical
PWR and BWR were categorized based upon the feasibility of introducing on-line
performance and extending their surveillance intervals. This report identified specific
surveillance approaches that would allow these nuclear power plants to achieve longer
operational cycles. The method applied in this report was qualitative rather than
quantitative.
This report focuses upon the establishment of a quantitative methodology for
justifying the surveillance interval extension. Accordingly, this report exclusively
addresses surveillances which cannot be performed on-line and whose intervals are less
than the longer operational cycle such as 48 months. Formulating the rationale for on-line
performance of surveillances is beyond the scope of this report.
1.2. Objective
The objective of this report is to establish a quantitative methodology for
rationalizing the surveillance interval extension in order to achieve a longer operational
cycle.
Chapter 2 presents how to justify the surveillance interval extension on a theoretical
basis. The strategy is described and the data requirement for the analysis is specified. This
chapter proposes the economic and safety requirements which must be satisfied if the
surveillance intervals are extended. Then, the plant's systems/components are prioritized
by importance in terms of the economic and safety performance of the plant. On the basis
of these rankings, those components which may be a limiting factor for going to a longer
operational cycle are identified. Finally, a standard method of investment in
economic/safety performance improvement is proposed. The output of this method is the
most cost-effective combination of improvements needed to fulfill the specified safety and
economic requirements of the power plant.
Chapter 3 is dedicated exclusively to various failure data, which are essential inputs
to the quantitative methodology for the surveillance interval extension. The failure data
discussed in this chapter include hardware failure data, common cause failure data and age
dependent failure data. The sources of these failure data are specified. A standard analysis
method of failure data is also proposed.
Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate how the methodology developed thus far applies to a
set of components. Chapter 4 addresses the treatment of economically important
components. Chapter 5 addresses the treatment of systems/components important to
safety. Prospective improvements of the repair time and the reliability of selected
components are proposed based upon interviews with experts at the example PWR power
plant and the plant's equipment manufacturers. Finally, Chapter 6 presents the summary,
conclusions, future work and implications.
Chapter 2. Surveillance Interval Extension Methodology
2.1. Introduction
The term 'surveillance' is broad in scope. It includes a variety of component
testing, overhauls, and maintenance activities. Though some surveillances can be
performed on-line, others must be performed off-line because of safety concerns,
inaccessibility of a component and so on. What kind of surveillance could pose the most
serious problem to the introduction of a longer operational cycle? It would be the
surveillance which requires off-line performance and whose current interval is less than the
longer cycle length. This type of surveillance is the central focus of this report.
There are two fundamental ways that a surveillance can be conducted in order to
support a longer operational cycle. The surveillance can be conducted while the plant is at
power or the surveillance interval can be extended to coincide with the new operational
cycle length. This report exclusively addresses the latter option, the surveillance interval
extension. By quantitatively justifying the surveillance interval extension, we try to
support achieving the longer operational cycle.
In this chapter, a methodology for quantitatively rationalizing the surveillance
interval extension is presented on a theoretical basis. First, the negative effects associated
with the surveillance interval extension upon the reliability of components are discussed.
Second, the economic and safety requirements, which must be satisfied in order to be
consistent with a longer operational cycle, are presented. Third, systems/components are
prioritized by importance in terms of economic and safety performance of the plant,
respectively. On the basis of these rankings, we can estimate which components may
increase the forced outage length and the effects upon the core damage risk if the
operational duration is extended. In addition, we can estimate how large the forced outage
length and the core damage risk would be. Finally, a method of selecting investments
needed for improvements in the economic and safety performance of the plant is developed.
The output of using this methodology is the most cost-effective combination of
improvements that satisfy the specified economic and safety requirements of the power
plant.
2.2. Negative Effect of Surveillance Interval Extension
The purpose of surveillances is to ensure the operability of a component and detect
unfavorable symptoms which may lead to a failure. Therefore a surveillance interval
extension potentially has a negative effect upon component reliability.
Generally speaking, the relation between the surveillance interval and the
unavailability of a system/component is like the U-shape curve shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1. Typical Relation Between Unavailability and Surveillance Interval
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As shown in Figure 2.1, overly-frequent surveillances can result in low system
availability. This is because the system may be taken out of service often due to the
surveillance itself and due to the repair of test-caused failures of the component. The test-
caused failures include those incurred by wear and tear of the component due to the
surveillances. On the other hand, as the surveillance interval increases, the component's
unavailability will grow because of increased occurrences of time-dependent random
failures. In that situation, the component cannot be relied upon, and accordingly the
system unavailability will increase. Thus, there should be an optimal component
surveillance interval in terms of the corresponding system availability.
The purpose of this study is to rationalize quantitatively the surveillance interval
extension from the current operational cycle, ranging from 18 to 24 months, to a longer
operational cycle such as 48 months. For these surveillances, the total number to be
performed during the power plant's lifetime is small compared to the number which can be
tolerated. Therefore, the adverse effects associated with the over-frequent surveillances can
be ignored. In this case, the relation between the system unavailability and the surveillance
interval can be illustrated as shown in Figure. 2.2.
Figure 2.2. Relation Between Unavailability and Surveillance Interval
Omitting Negative Effect of Overly-frequent Surveillance
Unavailability
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Without consideration of the negative effects of overly-frequent surveillances, the
system unavailability increases as the surveillance interval increases. This deteriorated
availability of systems/components can pose problems in terms of both the economic and
safety performance of a plant. As for the economic performance of a plant, the increased
unavailability of systems/components may lead to an increase in the forced outage length,
which must be kept short in order to achieve a higher capacity factor. On the other hand,
the increased unavailability of the system/component can increase the core damage risk,
which must be kept low.
2.3. Surveillance Interval Extension Methodology
In this section, the surveillance interval extension methodology is thoroughly
discussed. This methodology consists of the following five steps.
STEP 1 Establishment of economic/safety requirements
STEP 2 Proposal of economic/safety importance rankings
STEP 3 Survey of failure data
STEP 4 Estimation of economic/safety performance
STEP 5 Improvement to satisfy economic/safety requirements.
2.3.1. STEP 1 - Establishment of Economic/Safety Requirements
2.3.1.1. Economic Requirements
The economic performance of the nuclear plant may be altered in several aspects by
going a longer operational interval. For example, the maintenance and fuel expenses of the
plant may increase. However, in this report, we are mainly concerned with the operational
availability of the plant.
On the assumption that there is no partial output state of a power plant, a capacity
factor can be defined as
L-F-P
C=, (2.1)L
where Cf is a capacity factor, L is the operational cycle length, F is the total forced
outage length and P is the total planned outage length. As discussed in Chapter 1, there are
three ways by which a capacity factor is improved as shown below:
(1) To increase the operational length, L,
(2) To decrease the total forced outage length, F, and
(3) To decrease the total planned outage length, P.
It is conceivable that increasing an operational cycle may lead to an increase in the
forced outage length achieved. Therefore, even if the longer operational cycle is achieved,
whether or not it leads to a higher capacity factor depends upon the forced outage length.
In this study, the following cycle parameters are set as the economic requirement:
(1) The operational cycle length, L = 48 months, and
(2) The forced outage length, F = 43 days = 1032 hours
Since, currently, the longest operational cycle length of the U.S. nuclear power
plant is 24 months, a 48-month operational cycle is ambitious. On the assumption of a 30-
day planned outage length, a 43-day forced outage length corresponds to 3% of the
effective cycle length, which is the operational cycle length minus the planned outage
length. The rationale for determining the forced outage length is based upon the plant
availability goal which U.S. nuclear plant operators are likely to establish as the year 2000
goal. This economic requirement corresponds to a 95.0% capacity factor, which
considerably exceeds the industry average 72.9% (average between 1992 and 1994 in the
US).
The economic requirement can be expressed as
F X Fj48m - 1032hrs, (2.2)
where Fj48m is the forced outage length due to the failures of the j-th
system/component during a 48-month operational cycle.
2.3.1.2. Safety Requirement
Currently, Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is applied extensively to evaluate
the safety of a nuclear power plant. As a result of PRA, the Core Damage Frequency
(CDF) value is provided. The CDF value is derived by summing the frequencies of the
plant's minimal cutsets that lead to core damage. A minimal cutset is the smallest
combination of an initiating event and basic events, which if they all were to occur would
result in core damage. The basic events consists of independent component failures,
conditional events, and human errors. A minimal cutset frequency is quantified by
multiplying the frequency of the initiating event in the minimal cutset by the probabilities of
the basic events. Therefore, if the surveillance interval extensions increase the frequencies
of the initiating events or the probabilities of the basic events, a negative effect upon safety
can result.
It is a challenging task to determine what is an allowable increase in the CDF value
when a 48-month operational cycle is introduced. The only restriction related to the CDF
value is that the CDF value of a US nuclear power plant must be less than 10-4 (per reactor
year), which is a portion of the safety goal stipulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) 2. Within this legal limit, each nuclear power plant in the US has its
own value of the CDF, and the estimated CDF values vary widely. Existing regulations do
not prohibit an increase in the CDF value to this legal limit. However, in practice, it is not
permissible to reduce safety for the enhanced economic performance of the plant. This is
because current PRA methods are not sufficiently accurate or consistent, because the
utilities are reluctant to incur the economic consequences which would result from a severe
accident, and because the public is reluctant to accept any diminution of safety of the
nuclear power plant.
In this study, the safety requirement is set as
SCDFi48m < CDFi8sm . (2.3)
i i
The quantities, CDFi48m and CDFil8m, represent the core damage frequency of the
i-th cutset for a 48-month and an 18-month operational cycle, respectively. Since many
nuclear power plants in the U.S. currently adopt an 18-month operational cycle,
henceforth, the current operational cycle is assumed to be 18 months in this study. This
equation signifies that the total CDF value is not allowed to increase when the operational
cycle is extended. In the case that this requirement is not satisfied, some improvement in
reliability of the plant's systems/components must be carried out to meet it. A method of
investment in reliability improvement to satisfy this safety requirement is discussed in
Section 2.3.5.
2.3.2. STEP 2 - Proposal of Economic/Safety Importance Rankings
In this step, systems/components are prioritized by importance in terms of
economic and safety performance of a plant. Based on these importance rankings, the
system/component which may be a limiting factor for going to a 48-month operational
interval from economic and safety perspectives can be identified.
2.3.2.1. Economic Importance Ranking
An economic importance ranking can be defined as a ranking which prioritizes
systems/components according to the respective contributions to the total forced outage
length due to failures of their corresponding systems/components. The underlying
assumption is that the economic loss due to the loss of electricity generation is much more
significant than any other economic factor associated with the failure of the
systems/components (e.g., repair cost).
The Monthly Operating Report Tracking Data3 is a useful data source for creating
an economic importance ranking. This data source, which is maintained by the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) for the NRC, includes information reported to the
NRC about the all outages incurred at US nuclear power plants. A PWR economic
importance ranking based upon the Monthly Operating Report Tracking Data (1993 to
1995) is shown in Table 2.1. Note that, although the Monthly Operating Report Tracking
Data include data of both the planned and forced outages, only forced outage data are
applied to make Table 2.1.
Note that this economic importance ranking is not plant-specific but generic.
Utilities must make their own economic importance rankings based upon their plant-
specific operational history as well as from this industry-wide economic importance
ranking. Operational history is useful for identifying plant-specific weakness. An
industry-wide importance ranking is useful for estimating failures that the plant has not
experienced.
Table 2.1. Economic Importance Ranking of PWR Plant's System/Component 3(1993-95)
Rank System/component Outage length Contribution Total Implied
to total forced Number of MTTR
outage length failures
(hr) (%) (hr)
1 Steam extraction piping 5623.5 9.98 1 5623.51
2 Reactor coolant pump 4798.5 8.51 18 266.60
3 Transformer 3543.4 6.29 17 208.44
4 Steam generator 3221.9 5.72 11 292.90
5 Safety injection valves 3216.2 5.71 2 1608.10
6 Main feedwater pump 2518.1 4.47 27 93.30
7 Generator bus duct 2129.6 3.78 3 709.87
8 Breaker 2101.4 3.73 3 700.47
9 Auxiliary feedwater pump 2048.6 3.63 1 2048.60
10 Electro hydraulic control system 1566.2 2.78 15 104.41
11 Circulating water system 1548.5 2.75 5 309.70
12 Generator support system 1524.1 2.70 15 101.61
13 Reactor coolant system 1426.2 2.53 8 178.28
14 Main steam isolation valve 1402.5 2.49 10 140.25
15 Service water system 1132.7 2.01 2 566.35
16 Control rod drive system 1115.7 1.98 9 123.97
17 Emergency diesel generator 1093.3 1.93 3 364.43
18 Main feedwater system (except for pump) 940.7 1.67 8 117.59
19 Pressurizer 840.4 1.49 5 168.08
20 Main generator 803.1 1.42 8 100.39
21 Turbine support system 795.8 1.41 8 99.48
22 Pressurizer safety valve 717.5 1.27 4 179.38
23 Steam extraction valve 702.4 1.25 4 175.60
24 Containment spray system 688.0 1.22 1 688.00
25 Letdown system 605.2 1.07 4 151.30
26 Reactor instrumentation 576.5 1.02 9 64.06
27 Condenser 495.6 0.88 8 61.95
28 Instrumentation air line 457.7 0.81 1 457.70
29 Feedwater instrumentation 410.5 0.73 10 41.05
30 Switchyard 352.4 0.63 4 88.10
31 Main steam instrumentation 326.8 0.58 2 163.40
32 Control rod 322.7 0.57 6 53.78
33 Circulating water 295.9 0.52 2 147.95
34 Centrifugal charging pump 274.4 0.49 2 137.20
35 Component cooling water system 264.4 0.47 3 88.13
36 Inverter 254.3 0.45 2 127.15
Table 2.1. Economic Importance Ranking of PWR Plant's System/Component 3(Cont.)
(1993-95)
Rank System/component Outage length Contribution Total Implied
to total forced Number MTTR
outage length of failures(hr) (%) (hr)
37 Safety injection pump 216.1 0.38 2 108.05
38 Main steam stop valve 210.0 0.37 1 210.00
39 Heater drain pump 192.0 0.34 2 96.00
40 Condensate piping 179.8 0.32 1 179.80
41 Voltage regulator 176.0 0.31 1 176.00
42 Main steam relief system 174.7 0.31 5 34.94
43 Reactor pressure vessel adapter canopy 165.3 0.29 1 165.30
44 Turbine control valve 161.1 0.29 3 53.70
45 Residual heat removal system 159.0 0.28 2 79.50
46 Feedwater mechanical 147.0 0.26 6 24.50
47 Steam generator instrumentation 146.9 0.26 3 48.97
48 Transducer 134.9 0.24 1 134.90
49 Heater drain tank 127.1 0.23 3 42.37
50 Condensate pump 124.0 0.22 1 124.00
51 Insulator 124.0 0.22 1 124.00
52 Electric grounding 123.3 0.22 1 123.30
53 Ice condenser 120.0 0.21 2 60.00
54 Primary system drain 120.0 0.21 1 120.00
55 I/P transducer 82.0 0.15 1 82.00
56 Offsite power 78.3 0.14 2 39.15
57 Heat sink protection 69.7 0.12 1 69.70
58 Minimum excitation limitter 67.0 0.12 1 67.00
59 Safety injection tank 59.8 0.11 1 59.80
60 Turbine 51.9 0.09 3 17.30
61 Primary containment vessel 48.9 0.09 1 48.90
instrumentation
62 Main steam gasket 36.5 0.06 2 18.25
63 Grand seal steam spillover valve 30.8 0.05 1 30.80
64 Fire protection sprinkler head 20.7 0.04 1 20.70
65 Main steam drain collector box 17.1 0.03 1 17.10
66 Power control relay 16.8 0.03 1 16.80
67 Moisture separator reheater 9.7 0.02 1 9.70
unclear 2843.3 5.04 16 177.71
Total 56422.1 100.00 312.0
The definitions of the contribution to the total forced outage length and the implied
mean time to repair (MTTR) of a system/component shown in Table 2.1. are presented
below:
(1) The contribution to the total forced outage length is obtained as
C = - x 100 (%), (2.4)
F
where Cj is the contribution of the j-th system/component to the total forced outage
length, Fj is the total forced outage length due to failures of the j-th system/component, and
F is the total forced outage length of the plant ; and
(2) The implied mean time to repair (MTTR) is obtained as
MTTRj = -- , (2.5)
nj
where MTTRj is the implied mean time to repair the j-th system/component, Fj is
the total forced outage length due to failures of the j-th system/component, and nj is the
total number of failures of the j-th system/component.
2.3.2.2. Maximum Allowable Forced Outage Length
In Section 2.3.1.1., the economic requirement is set as a 43-day forced outage
length, given a 48-month operational cycle length. This section proposes a concept for
determining the maximum allowable forced outage length of each system/component. The
maximum allowable forced outage length is defined as the maximum length of the forced
outage due to failures of each system/component that can be tolerated while still satisfying
the stated economic requirement. The following equation gives the definition of the
maximum allowable forced outage length.
MFj = 4 3 (days) X 2 4 (hours / day) X Ci (hours), (2.6)
where MFj is the maximum allowable forced outage length of the j-th
system/component and Cj is the contribution of the j-th system/component to the total
forced outage length.
For example, the transformer has a 6.29% contribution to the total forced outage
length according to Table 2.1. Therefore, the transformer's maximum allowable forced
outage length consistent with 43 days of forced outage is expressed as 43 x 24 x 0.0629 =
64.91 hours.
The underlying assumption of this approach is that each system/component has an
allowable share of the total forced outage length requirement (43 days) in proportion to the
actual contribution to the total forced outage length given in Table 2.1. The basis of this
assumption is the idea that the past reliability performance of a component reveals its
natural capability.
However, this approach to individual component goal-setting is not ideal because
the past share of the total forced outage length is decided by experience and does not give
insight into the future. In other words, a system/component that did not cause a forced
outage from 1993 to 1995 is given zero allowable forced outage length. Moreover this
approach neglects the possibility that it may be much more difficult to improve the
performance of some systems/components than that of others.
If the expected forced outage length of a given component exceeds its maximum
allowable forced outage length, there are two ways by which we can offset this excess
forced outage length. One way is improvement in the reliability and/or MTTR of that
component itself. The other way is improvement of other components. Which way should
be taken depends upon the amount of required investment. A scheme for allocating
investments for reducing the forced outage length is described in Section 2.3.5.4.
The maximum allowable forced outage length of each system/component is given in
Table 2.2. We utilize the concept of the maximum allowable forced outage lengths of
selected components as the economic requirement in Chapter 4. This is because we
address a set of components rather than the whole plant for a demonstration of the
surveillance interval extension methodology in Chapter 4, and we need a substitute
economic requirement.
Table 2.2. Maximum Allowable Forced Outage Length of Systems/Components of PWR
Plant for A 48-month Operational Cycle With 3% Total Forced Outage Rate
Rank System/component Maximum allowabl
forced outage length(hr)
1 Steam extraction piping 102.95
2 Reactor coolant pump 87.90
3 Transformer 64.91
4 Steam generator 59.00
5 Safety injection valves 58.88
6 Main feedwater pump 46.10
7 Generator bus duct 38.99
8 Breaker 38.47
9 Auxiliary feedwater pump 37.51
10 Electro hydraulic control system 28.67
11 Circulating water system 28.35
12 Generator support system 27.91
13 Reactor coolant system 26.11
14 Main steam isolation valve 25.68
15 Service water system 20.74
16 Control rod drive system 20.43
17 Emergency diesel generator 19.91
18 Main feedwater system (except for pump) 17.22
19 Pressurizer 15.38
20 Main Generator 14.65
21 Turbine support system 14.57
22 Pressurizer safety valve 13.14
23 Steam extraction valve 12.86
24 Containment spray system 12.60
25 Letdown system 11.08
26 Reactor instrumentation 10.56
27 Condenser 9.07
28 Instrumentation air line 8.39
29 Feedwater instrumentation 7.51
30 Switchyard 6.45
31 Main steam instrumentation 5.99
32 Control rod 5.91
33 Circulating water 5.42
34 Centrifugal charging pump 5.02
35 Component cooling water system 4.84
36 Inverter 4.65
Table 2.2. Maximum Allowable Forced Outage Length of Systems/Components of PWR
Plant for A 48-month Operational Cycle With 3% Total Forced Outage Rate (Cont.)
Rank System/component Maximum allowable
forced outage length
37 Safety injection pump 3.96
38 Main steam stop valve 3.85
39 Heater drain pump 3.52
40 Condensate piping 3.29
41 Voltage regulator 3.23
42 Main steam relief system 3.20
43 Reactor pressure vessel adapter canopy 3.03
44 Turbine control valve 2.95
45 Residual heat removal system 2.91
46 Feedwater mechanical 2.69
47 Steam generator instrumentation 2.69
48 Transducer 2.47
49 Heater drain tank 2.32
50 Condensate pump 2.27
51 Insulator 2.27
52 Electric grounding 2.26
53 Ice condenser 2.19
54 Primary system drain 2.19
55 I/P transducer 1.51
56 Offsite power 1.43
57 Heat sink protection 1.28
58 Minimum excitation limitter 1.23
59 Safety injection tank 1.10
60 Turbine 0.95
61 Primary containment vessel 0.89
instrumentation
62 Main steam gasket 0.67
63 Grand seal steam spillover valve 0.56
64 Fire protection sprinkler head 0.38
65 Main steam drain collector box 0.31
66 Power control relay 0.31
67 Moisture separator reheater 0.18
unclear 52.05
Total 1032.00
2.3.2.3. Safety Importance Ranking
Various safety importance measures are calculated in a Probabilistic Risk
Assessment (PRA). One way to identify the safety importance is to identify the fraction of
the current CDF value associated with a given system/component. The risk contributions in
a PRA are prioritized in terms of the minimal cutset contributions to the CDF value.
The CDF contribution from a given minimal cutset is calculated by multiplying the
frequency of an initiating event in the minimal cutset by the probabilities of the basic events
in the minimal cutset. The PRA identifies the minimal cutsets which can result in core
damage and ranks them in order of their CDF contribution from the largest to a certain
cutoff value. The basic events are prioritized according to the cutset frequency where the
corresponding basic event first appears in the cutset ranking.
In NUREG/CR-6002 4, potentially maintainable basic events are prioritized based
upon NUREG/CR-4550 5, where the internal events of the Surry nuclear power station
unitl are analyzed. Potentially maintainable basic events mean those arising from
component failures and do not include conditional events and failures due to human errors.
However, NUREG/CR-6002 does not use this criterion consistently in ranking
maintainable basic events. For example, an basic event ID " RCP-LOCA-750-90M "
represents a conditional probability that the Reactor Coolant Pump seal LOCA (Loss of
Coolant Accident) occurs at 750 gpm 90 minutes after the loss of seal coolant. Although
this basic event is listed first on the maintainable event prioritization ranking, it does not
represent a component failure. Elimination of conditional probabilities and human errors
from the maintainable event prioritization ranking of NUREG/CR-6002 results in Table
2.3. In this table, the cutset frequency associated with each basic event is categorized by
systems/components. Note that the summation of the cutset frequency is not equal to the
total CDF value, because the cutset frequency where a certain basic event first appears in
the cutset ranking is regarded as the contribution of that basic event to the CDF value. This
table shows the prioritization of the relative importance of system/component in terms of its
contribution to the CDF value.
Table 2.3. Safety Importance Ranking of PWR Plant's Systems/Components
(Minimal Cutset Prioritization)
Rank System/Component Number Summation of Approximated
of basic cutset frequencies contribution to
events (1/year) the CDF value(%)
1 Emergency diesel generator 13 4.26E-6 33.1
2 Low pressure injection system 18 1.98E-6 15.4
3 Primary pressure relief system 12 1.14E-6 8.9
4 Auxiliary feedwater system 20 1.06E-6 8.2
5 High pressure injection system 16 8.93E-7 6.9
6 Accumulator system 6 8.50E-7 6.6
7 Manual scram system 1 8.43E-7 6.6
8 Reactor protection system 1 8.43E-7 6.6
9 Steam generator relief valves 3 8.38E-7 6.5
10 Charging pump cooling check valve 9 4.48E-8 0.3
11 Refueling water storage tank 1 3.51E-8 0.3
12 AC power system 4 2.10E-8 0.2
13 Safety injection system 2 2.04E-8 0.2
14 Instrument air system 1 1.47E-8 0.1
15 Recirculation mode transfer 2 5.12E-9 0.0
16 DC power bus 2 4.60E-9 0.0
17 Chemical and volume control system 1 2.02E-9 0.0
Total 112 1.29E-5 100.0
From this ranking, we can identify which systems/components have larger
contributions to the CDF value than others. It must be noted that as the surveillance
interval increases, some systems/components may increase their contributions to the CDF
value and others may not. Surveillances of some systems/components (e.g., Emergency
Diesel Generator) can be conducted on-line. Therefore the unavailabilities of those
systems/components may stay reasonably unchanged, and the CDF contributions arising
from those systems/components may remain the same.
Another approach to the safety importance ranking is to focus upon the initiating
events. The PRA usually does not prioritize the initiating events. Since the frequencies of
the initiating events are determined by operational experience, it is conceivable that the
values of the frequencies of the initiating events will increase when the operational cycle
length is extended. Table 2.4 is a safety importance ranking categorized by the initiating
events and the associated CDF value. This ranking is based upon NUREG/CR-4550 5
which is also the original data source of Table 2.3.
Table 2.4. Safety Importance Ranking (Initiating Event Prioritization)
Event CDF value of Contribu-
Rank Initiating Event Description frequency sequences in tion to the
(1/yr) which it total CDF
participates value
(1/year) (%)
Loss of Offsite Failure of offsite grid 7.7E-2 2.79E-5 68.17
1 Power Loss of station reserve power
Loss of power to switchyard
2 Medium LOCA Equivalent diameter between 2 1.OE-3 3.23E-6 7.89
and 6 inches
3 Steam Generator Tube rupture 1.OE-2 1.92E-6 4.69
Tube Rupture
4 Large LOCA Equivalent diameter greater 5.OE-4 1.77E-6 4.32
than 6 inches
5 Loss of Failure of Main feedwater 9.4E-1 1.72E-6 4.20
Feedwater
6 Interfacing Interfacing LOCA 1.6E-6 1.60E-6 3.91
LOCA
7 Transient All transients requiring scram 6.6E-0 1.46E-6 3.57
requiring scram
Very small Equivalent diameter greater 1.3E-2 6.30E-7 1.54
8 LOCA than 1/2 inches, including RCP
seal failure
9 Small LOCA Equivalent diameter between 1.OE-3 4.40E-7 1.08
1/2 and 2 inches
10 Loss of DC bus Short on DC bus 1.0OE-2 2.60E-7 0.64
TOTAL 4.09E-5 100.00
Since all cutsets have only one initiating event, the summation of the CDF value
associated with each initiating event is equal to the total CDF value. In contrast to the
minimal cutset importance ranking, this ranking often does not specify which component is
responsible for an initiating event (e.g., transient requiring scram). Therefore, the
application of this initiating event importance ranking to the quantitative analysis may be
limited and it is not used in this study.
2.3.3. STEP 3 - Survey of Failure Data
Failure data, essential inputs for the quantitative analysis, are surveyed in this step.
Chapter 3 is dedicated exclusively to various failure data sources. A method of analysis of
failure data is also proposed in Chapter 3.
For systems/components important to safety, the data source should be the plant-
specific PRA study. Since safety is eventually estimated in terms of the CDF value using a
PRA method, the data source must be consistent with the results of the failure data survey
in the PRA analysis.
2.3.4. STEP 4 - Estimation of Economic/Safety Performance
In this step, based upon the importance rankings developed in STEP 2 and the
failure data surveyed in STEP 3, the economic and safety performance, which are
associated with a 48-month operational length, is evaluated. As discussed earlier, the
economic performance of a plant associated with a longer operational cycle is measured by
the forced outage length. The safety performance of a plant is measured by the CDF value.
2.3.4.1. Estimation of Economic Performance
As discussed in Section 2.3.1.1., we are mainly concerned with achieving a higher
capacity factor by extending the operational cycle length and reducing the forced outage
length.
The basic equation used to calculate the expected forced outage length is
Fj48m = MTTRi X nj48m, (2.7)
where MTTRj is the mean time to repair the j-th system/component and nj48m is the
expected number of failures of the j-th system/component during a 48-month operational
cycle.
The expected number of failures increase when the surveillance interval increases.
For example, if a component has a constant failure rate X (1/hr), the expected number of
failures of this component, nj, is shown as
nj = N, x A x t, (2.8)
where Nj is the number of the j-th component, Xj is the failure rate of the j-th
component, and t is operational length.
It must be pointed out that failure rates of the components may increase from the
current estimations when the operational duration is extended. However, because of
scarcity of supporting data for age-dependent failures, we treat failure rates of the
components as being constant throughout this report. Potential underestimation of the
forced outage length incurred by the underestimation of the component failure rates must be
taken into account. An overview of age-dependent failures from the previously published
material is summarized in Section 3.5.
The gap between the expected forced outage length during a 48-month cycle and the
economic requirement is defined as
AF = XFj48m -1032 (hours). (2.9)
The quantity, AF, indicates how much the expected forced outage length deviates
from the economic requirement (43 days = 1032 hours of the forced outage length). In
order to satisfy the economic requirement, the value of AF must be reduced to at least zero
by improving the reliability and/or repair time of the systems/components.
2.3.4.2. Estimation of Safety Performance
Assume that the probabilities of the potentially maintainable basic events and the
initiating event frequencies are increased because of the surveillance interval extension.
Again, the potentially maintainable basic events represent those arising from component
failures. Assume that the new frequency of an initiating event is a factor of (1+f) as great
as the original frequency and the new probabilities of all potentially maintainable basic
events are a factor of (l+g) as great as the original probabilities. In the absence of better
information, the same values of f and g are assumed to apply to respective initiating event
and potentially maintainable basic events. Then the new cutset frequency is expressed as
CDFi48m = CDFs18m(1 + f)(1 + g)ni, (2.10)
where CDFi48m is the CDF value associated with the i-th cutset when the
operational cycle length is 48 months, CDFi18m is the CDF value associated with the i-th
cutset when the operational cycle length is 18 months, f is a factor of change in the
initiating event frequency, g is a factor of change in the probabilities of basic events
associated with the failures of maintainable components, and ni is the number of the
potentially maintainable basic events in the i-th cutset.
Expanding Eq. (2.10) as a power series gives
CDFi48m = CDFilsm(l + f) 1 + nig + ni)g2 +.
= CDFilsm + CDFism. f + (1+ f) CDFilsm n i. g + g2 +. . (2.11)
Now, when CDFi 48m is summed over all the cutsets to obtain the new CDF value,
the first term on the right hand side of Eq.(2.11) gives the original value of the CDF. For
each maintainable component, the third term will give CDFi18m-g for each cutset containing
the component. For each pair of maintainable components, the fourth term will yield
CDFil8m.g 2 for each cutset containing the pair. Hence we may write the expression for
each term as follows:
CDFism ni = rk, (2.12)
i k
-CDFil8sm - '2i)= rklk2, and (2.13)
kl>k2
CDFilm .g"' = rkl...kni g n . (2.14)
kl>...>kn,
where n is the sum of the minimal cutset contributions containing the k-th basic
event, rklk2 is the sum of minimal cutset contributions, each containing the kl-th and the k2-
th basic events, etc. The quantity rk is often called risk reduction and the quantities rklk2,
..., rkl...kni are often called joint risk reduction. The risk reduction terms are so named
because they indicate the risk reduction, i.e., the reduction in the CDF value, if the
probability of the associated basic event were reduced to zero.
Substituting Eq.(2.12), (2.13), and (2.14) into Eq.(2.1 1) provides the following
equations.
SCDFi48m = (1+ f) CDFi18m+ rk g + rTklk2 .g 2+...+ JTkl...kni.gnl), (2.15)
i i k kl>k2 ki>...>kni
or
ACDF = f CDFilsm +(1+ f) - rk. g + Tklk2 .g 2 +...+ rTkl...kni .gni . (2.16)
i k kl>k2 kl>...>kni
The quantity, ACDF, indicates how much the CDF value deviates from the safety
requirement developed in Section 2.3.1.2. In order to satisfy the plant's safety
requirement, the value of ACDF must be reduced to at least zero through improvement of
the reliability of systems/components.
Note that, if the initiating event frequency stays unchanged, by setting f=O,
Eq.(2.16) can be written as
ACDF= Irkg+ rklk2 g2+...+ rkCl...ki'gn'. (2.17)
k kl>k2 kl>...>kni
A simple illustration of the equations presented in this section is provided in
Appendix A.
2.3.5. STEP 5 - Improvement to Satisfy Economic/Safety Requirements
In this step, a method of selecting economically optimized investments for
reductions of the forced outage length and the CDF value is formulated in order to satisfy
both economic and safety requirements.
2.3.5.1. Categorization of Important Systems/Components
It is worthwhile to categorize systems/components into the following four classes:
Class 1: Important systems/components in terms of both economic and safety
performance of a plant (e.g., the Safety Injection System),
Class 2: Important systems/components in terms of only the economic performance
of a plant ( e.g., Transformers),
Class 3: Important systems/components in terms of only the safety performance of
a plant ( e.g., the High Pressure Injection System), and
Class 4: Unimportant systems/components.
By examining both economic and safety importance rankings, all
systems/components can be categorized into one of these four classes. In this
categorization, the safety importance ranking refers to the minimal cutset safety importance
ranking (Table 2.3.) rather than the initiating event safety importance ranking (Table 2.4.).
This is because the former is more clearly associated with specific systems/components
than the latter.
For example, if a component is listed on both economic and safety importance
rankings, it will be categorized into Class 1. The systems/components which belong to the
first three classes may have to be improved to satisfy the economic and safety
requirements.
2.3.5.2. Factors for Improvement
From Eq. (2.7), there are two ways to reduce the expected forced outage length
(Fj48m): reducing MTTR and reducing the expected number of failures (nj48m). To reduce
the CDF value, we must reduce the initiating event frequencies and/or the probabilities of
basic events. The expected number of failures, the probabilities of the basic events and the
frequencies of the initiating events are functions of failure rates and/or failure probability of
a component. Therefore, for important systems/components in terms of both economic and
safety performance of a plant, if improvements address failure rates and/or failure
probabilities, they can reduce both the forced outage length and the CDF value.
The primary and fundamental factors for improvement of the plant performance are
summarized in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5. Factors Affecting Improvement
Category Primary factor Fundamental factor
Economic Mean time to repair Preparation for rapid repair
Performance Expected number of failures Failure rates or failure
probabilities
Safety Probabilities of basic events Failure rates or failure
Performance Frequencies of initiating probabilities
events
2.3.5.3. Order of Improvement
There are two requirements -- the economic and safety requirements-- to be
satisfied. Since some systems/components are important in terms of both economic and
safety performance of a plant, which requirement is satisfied first may affect the result, the
most cost-effective combination of improvements. Therefore, utilities are advised to try
two cases. One case is that the economic requirement is first addressed and then the safety
requirement is addressed. The other case is the reverse order of the first case. Thereby
utilities can choose the most cost-effective combination of improvements.
2.3.5.4. Improvement to Satisfy Economic Requirement
Class 1 and 2 systems/components must be improved in order to reduce the
expected forced outage length and to satisfy the economic requirement.
Eq.(2.7) is differentiated as
dF_ dnj 9MTTRj
= MTTRi . + n- , (2.18)
where the quantity $j is the amount of money invested in improvement of the j-th
dFj
component. The magnitude of the quantity, -•j, indicates the effect of marginald$j
investments upon reducing the expected forced outage length due to failures of the j-th
system/component. The suffix "48m" has been removed from Eq.(2.7) in the interest of
dF.
simplicity. Note that the quantity, , is negative because the forced outage lengthj$j
should be reduced by the investments. Therefore, the most effective marginal investment
in the improvement corresponds to the smallest value of F
d$j
Eq. (2.18) indicates that the forced outage length can be improved by spending
money on either reducing the expected number of failures or shortening the value of
MTTR. An example of the relation between d and $j is expressed in Figure 2.3.
d$'
Figure 2.3. Example of Effects of Investments in Improvement of Forced Outage Length
S $
Fj
Each system/component has its own curve representing the effects of marginal
investments in reducing the forced outage length. In the current state of knowledge, these
curves have not yet been quantified. However, these quantitative features can be discussed
usefully. Generally speaking, the effect of marginal investments is high at first and
becomes lower as more money is invested. Investment must be made in the different
dFj
systems/components according to the most favorable value of , until the economicd$.i
requirement, XFj48m < 1032hours, is satisfied.
To take an example of the data of Figure 2.3., the corresponding sequence of
investments is discussed below.
(1) Initially, the budget for improvement must be allocated solely to component 1,
because the investment has the largest marginal effect upon component 1 (i.e.,
dF1the smallest value of - ).d$j
(2) The investment in component 1 will be continued until it reaches the point B',
where the effects of marginal investments are identical for both components 1
and 2. The budget must be then spent on improvement of both components 1
and 2 from this point on. The relative slopes of the curves for these
components could be used to indicate the sequence of alternate investments in
each component. The area surrounded by the points A, B', X and O represents
how much the forced outage length associated with component 1 is reduced
thus far, through investments of the budget in component 1.
(3) The investment in components 1 and 2 will be continued until they reach the
points C' and C", respectively. At these points, the effects of marginal
investments in components 1, 2, and 3 become the same. From these points
on, the budget must be spent on component 3 as well as components 1 and 2.
(4) Whatever the number of components may be, the same procedure must be
repeated until the economic requirement, Fj48m 5 1032hours, is satisfied.
This economic requirement corresponds to the condition that
f -$j dFj-$j
-d$1 <-AF. (2.19)
2.3.5.5. Improvement to Satisfy Safety Requirement
Next, Class 1 and 3 systems/components are improved to satisfy the safety
requirement. It must be pointed out that improvements made for satisfying the economic
requirement are sometimes significant enough to satisfy the safety requirement. Similarly,
if improvements for the safety performance are first addressed, improvements made for
satisfying the safety requirement are sometimes significant enough to satisfy the economic
requirement. This is because some systems/components are common targets for both
requirements.
dCDFThe magnitude of the quantity, , indicates the effect of marginal
5$k
investments upon reducing the CDF value. The quantity, $k, indicates the total investment
in the improvement of the reliability of the k-th component. Note that the quantity,
dCDF , is negative because the CDF value should be reduced by the investments.
d$k
Therefore, the most effective marginal investment in the improvement of the CDF value
dCDF
corresponds to the smallest value of . Figure 2.4. provides an example of the
d$k
dCDF
relation between and $k.d$k
Figure 2.4. Example of Effects of Investments in Improvement of CDF Value
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As in the case of the economic improvement, each system/component has its own
curve representing the effects of marginal investments in reducing the CDF value. In the
current state of knowledge, these curves have not yet been quantified. However, these
quantitative features can be discussed usefully. Generally speaking, the effect of marginal
investment is high at first and becomes lower as more money is invested. Investment must
be made in the different systems/components according to the most favorable values of
dCDF
CD$k , until the safety requirement, 1 CDFi48m < 2 CDFi8m,, is satisfied. Note that
suffix 'k' denotes the k-th component and suffix 'i' denotes the i-th minimal cutset.
Methods for improving the CDF value are the same as those for improving the
forced outage length.
To take an example of the data of Figure 2.4, the corresponding sequence of
investments is discussed below.
(1) Initially, the budget for improvement must be allocated solely to component 1,
because the investment has the largest marginal effect upon component 1 (i.e.,
dCDF
the smallest value of ).
d$k
(2) The investment in component 1 will be continued until it reaches the point B',
where the effects of marginal investments are identical for both components 1
and 2. The budget must be then spent on improvement of both components 1
and 2 from this point on. The relative slopes of the curves for these
components could be used to indicate the sequence of alternate investments in
each component. The area surrounded by the points A, B', X and O represents
how much the CDF value is reduced thus far, through investments of the
budget in component 1.
(3) The investment in components 1 and 2 will be continued until they reach the
points C' and C", respectively. At these points, the effects of marginal
investments in components 1, 2, and 3 become the same. From these points
on, the budget must be spent on component 3 as well as components 1 and 2.
(4) Whatever the number of components may be, the same procedure must be
repeated until the safety requirement, C CDFi48m • CDFilsm, is satisfied.
This economic requirement corresponds to the condition that
2k C d$k < -ACDF. (2.20)
2.4. Summary
In this chapter, a methodology for quantitatively rationalizing the surveillance
interval extension is presented on a theoretical basis. The result of using this methodology
is the most cost-effective combination of improvements that satisfy the specified economic
and safety requirements of the power plant.
Chapter 3. Failure Data
3.1. Introduction
This chapter is dedicated exclusively to failure data, which are essential inputs to the
quantitative methodology for the surveillance interval extension presented in Chapter 2.
First, it provides an introduction to available sources of failure data and some numerical
values of failure rates and failure probabilities. Then, this chapter proposes a standard
method for failure data analysis. A way to analyze unrefined failure data is illustrated in
this method. Finally, common cause failures and age dependent failures are addressed.
Available data sources for these failures are discussed.
One of the criticisms most frequently heard about any quantitative reliability study is
that of non-accessibility, or sometimes the apparent non-availability of the basic failure
data. Although acquisition of good failure data is fundamental to the whole quantitative
analysis, it is usually difficult. The reasons for this include the followings points:
* Descriptions of failures are vague, even misleading.
* Failure modes are sometimes unidentified.
* Operating hours and successful demands of standby components are often not recorded.
* The failure of a component depends not only on its design and quality of manufacture, but
also on the environment where it is placed. Temperature, mechanical stresses and system
configuration are important considerations. Identical components can often show
different failure rates in different environments.
* Even if the environment where the components are in service is the same (i.e. the same
plant), it is sometimes difficult to find enough failures involving those components to
verify the failure rate.
* Even if an accurate number of failures of a certain component during a known period is
obtained, the total population of components in use during that same period is often not
known.
* The definition of failure is obscure. For example, suppose a pump had minor leakage at
the sealing region, an operator realized it in a routine shift round and tightened a bolt.
Then the leakage stopped, and there was no effect upon the operation of the pump.
Would this be a failure?
* Failure data are often not categorized by failure causes. The failure due to a
manufacturer's defect or aging should be distinguished from random equipment failures.
* Failure causes are sometimes indistinguishable. Especially for a stand-by component,
time-related failures and demand failures are difficult to distinguish.
* Accessibility to failure data is sometimes limited because of its commercially sensitive
nature.
For quantitative analyses, it is not sufficient to know only the number of failures
occurring in a given period. Other information is needed to judge the effects of
environmental influences and the quality and the frequency of maintenance. This
information includes the following:
1. Mode of failure
2. Cause of failure
3. Sample size
4. Environmental working condition
5. True running time during the survey period
6. Number of demands during the survey period, especially for the standby
components
7. Repair time
8. Time interval between failures
9. Time interval between periodic surveillance activities.
3.2. Sources of Failure Data
To collect, store, and retrieve failure information effectively for many types of
devices is an enormous task and requires an organization consistent with defined reliability
objectives. There are roughly three kinds of data sources in the nuclear field; operational
histories, publications and reliability data banks.
3.2.1. Plant-Specific Operational Histories
The ideal situation for failure data estimates is to analyze statistically sufficient
number of plant-specific data based upon operational history. This would ensure that the
resulting estimates represent the effects of the factors specific to the operating environment
of the components. These factors include maintenance practices, installation, test
procedures, staff training, component manufacturers and the environment. Therefore, if
reliable failure data are available from the operational history of a certain power plant, they
are better than any other data to apply the quantitative approach to that plant.
Historical operational data are easily obtained for some plants and not for others.
As a rule, newer plants have better data than older ones. This is because the managements
of newer plants have been sensitive to the importance of reliability data and have tended to
collect the data in on-line data storage systems. However, it is sometimes difficult to find
statistically sufficient number of failures to verify the failure rate, especially for the newer
plants.
Potential data sources include periodic surveillance reports, maintenance reports and
control-room logs.
3.2.2. Publications
Currently, the most accessible data source is publications where actual plant data
are analyzed. However, in most of the reports listed below, failures of similar components
are treated collectively. Therefore, failure data taken from these publication are generic
rather than plant-specific. Discussed below are publications that may be useful for
acquiring failure data.
* Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400, NUREG-75/014, 1975)6
Appendix III of this report contains the failure data used, including unrefined data
from 1972, notes on test time, notes on maintenance time and frequency, the result of
human reliability analysis and some information on common cause failures.
* IEEE Guide to the Collection and Presentation of Electrical, Electronic, and Sensing
Component Reliability Data for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (IEEE Std 500-
1977) 7
This standard contains reliability data on the electrical, electronic and sensing
components found in most nuclear power plants, conventionally fueled generators and
industrial plants at that time.
* The In-Plant Reliability Data Base for Nuclear Plant Components: Interim Data Report -
the Pump Component (NUREG/CR-2886, 1982)8
* The In-Plant Reliability Data Base for Nuclear Plant Components: Interim Data Report -
the Valve Component (NUREG/CR-3154, 1983) 9
* The In-Plant Reliability Data Base for Nuclear Plant Components: Interim Data Report -
the Diesel generators, Batteries, Chargers and Inventors (NUREG/CR-3831, 1985)10
These reports, often called IPRDS, provide estimates of failure rates, maintenance
frequencies, mean time to repair, failure modes, and the failure cause breakdown of the
corresponding components. IPRDS utilize data from two PWR units and four BWR units
for pumps and valves, and five unspecified plants for diesel generators.
* Data Summaries of Licensee Event Reports of Valves at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power
Plants (NUREG/CR-1363, 1982)11
* Data Summaries of Licensee Event Reports of Pumps at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power
Plants (NUREG/CR-1205, 1982)12
* Data Summaries of Licensee Event Reports of Diesel Generators at U.S. Commercial
Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG/CR-1362, 1980)13
* Data Summaries of Licensee Event Reports of Protective Relays and Circuit Breakers at
U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG/CR-4126, 1985) 14
* Data Summaries of Licensee Event Reports of Selected Instrumentation and Control
Components at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG/CR-1740, 1980)15
These reports, often called LER, describe the results of analyses of component
failures reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in licensee event reports, an
abbreviated listings of the abnormal occurrences leading to a reactor shutdown. The report
details failure rates by the failure mode and by the reactor vendor. Included are failure
rates, failures on demand, and some information on repair times.
* Reliability of Emergency AC Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG/CR-
2989, 1983)16
In this report, a total of 1526 events are categorized by failure type for 120 diesel
generators. It provides failure rate, human error probability, common-cause failure
probability and mean time to repair.
* Diesel Generator Reliability at Nuclear Power Plants: Data and Preliminary Analysis
(EPRI NP-2433, 1982)17
This report also represents data related to the reliability of emergency diesel
generators. The sources include plant records, utility records, and licensee event reports
submitted to NRC. The data includes both unrefined information and estimates of failure
rates. The report details failure rates by the failure mode and mean time to repair.
* Interim Reliability Evaluation Program Procedure Guide (NUREG/CR-2728, 1983)18
This IREP report represents the opinion of experts for many estimates and does not
incorporate values based upon actual failure data.
* What Every Engineer Should Know About Reliability and Risk Analysis (M.Modarres) 19
In Appendix B of this book, failure data ranges of various components are shown
from other sources. Although the suggested mean values of failure rates are presented,
there is no explanation about how the suggested failure rates were selected.
Although these publications are quite handy data sources, they are not up-to-date
and failure data derived from them may not necessarily reflect current accurate values of
failure occurrences. Some examples of hardware failure data from these publications are
presented in Table 3.1. In most cases, failure data according to Modarres are larger than
those from other sources. In terms of magnitude, most of failure data listed in Table 3.1.
reasonably agrees within one order of magnitude except for the turbine driven pump
(failure mode is failure to run).
Table 3.1. Examples of Hardware Failure Rate from Publications Cited
(1) Turbine Driven Pump
Failure mode: failure to start
Data Source
WASH14006
IPRDS8
IREP 18
LER 12
Modarres 19
Failure probability(l /demand)
1.0e-3
1.1e-2
3.0e-2
1.0e-2
3.0e-2
Error Factor *
3
Failure mode: failure to run
Data Source
WASH 14006
IPRDS8
IREP18
LER 12
Modarres 19
Failure rate(1/hr)
3.0e-5
1.0e-4
1.0e-5
6.0e-5
5.0e-3
Error Factor *
(2) Motor Driven Pump
Failure mode: failure to start
Data Source Failure probability(l/demand) Error Factor *
WASH 14006 1.2e-3 3
IPRDS8  5.5e-3 -
IREP 18  3.0e-3 10
LER 12  4.0e-4 -
Modarres 19  3.0e-3 10
Failure mode: failure to run
Data Source
WASH 14006
IPRDS8
IREP 18
LER 12
Modarres 19
Failure rate(1/hr)
9.0e-5
2.4e-5
3.0e-5
7.0e-6
3.0e-5
Error Factor *
10
10
10
* Defined as EF=Pu/m=m/PL, where Pu and PL are the upper and lower 95 percentile of
lognormal distribution and m is its median.
(3) Motor Operated Valve
Failure mode: failure to remain open
Data Source
WASH 14006
IPRDS9
IREP18
LER 11
Modarres 19
Failure rate(1/hr)
1.0e-7
2.0e-7
1.0e-7
6.0e-8
1.0e-7
Error Factor *
Failure mode: failure to open or close
Data Source Failure probability(
WASH 14006 1.0e-3
IPRDS9  5.3e-4
IREP 18  3.0e-3
LER 11  6.0e-3
Modarres 19  3.0e-3
(4) Diesel Generator
Failure mode: failure to start
l/demand) Error Factor *
3
10
10
Data Source Failure probability(l/demand) Error Factor *
IPRDS 10  3.0e-3 -
IREP 18  3.0e-2 3
LER 13  4.0e-2 -
AC Power Study 16  2.5e-2
IEEE 7 8.0e-3
Modarres 19 3.0e-2
(5) Circuit Breaker
Failure mode: failure to remain open or closed
Data Source
WASH 14006
IREP 18
LER 14
IEEE7
Failure rate(l/hr)
3.0e-6
2.9e-6
4.5e-7
4.4e-6
Error Factor *
10
10
* Defined as EF=PU/m=m/PL, where Pu and PL are the upper and lower 95 percentile of
lognormal distribution and m is its median.
---
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3.2.3. Reliability Data Banks
A data bank may be defined as a comprehensive collection of libraries of data and is usually
centralized. The rate of acquiring knowledge has been so rapid in the nuclear power
industry that greater attention has been given to the collection, storage and analysis of data.
The Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System 20 , NPRDS, is an information exchange
system that provides engineering data and failure information on selected components in the
U.S. nuclear plants. The Institute of Nuclear Plant Operations, INPO, manages the
NPRDS on behalf of the US nuclear utilities.
The NPRDS includes engineering, operational and failure data on components
installed in the U.S. nuclear plants. The U.S. commercial nuclear plants submit detailed
design data on the operating characteristics of 4,000 to 6,000 components from
approximately 30 systems. The components selected for NPRDS are those necessary for
the safe operation and shutdown of a plant. Nuclear power plants submit failure
information each time that a reportable component cannot fully perform one of its designed
functions. This includes failures discovered during component operation and maintenance.
The NPRDS allows data analysts to extract failure data of a specific power plant as well as
industry-wide plants.
3.3. Standard Method for Failure Data Analysis
This section proposes a standard method for failure data analysis. Once unrefined
failure data are obtained from operational histories or failure data banks, it must be carefully
reviewed so that erroneous estimations of reliability are avoided.
Analysis of failure data of components is a multistep process involving the
development of both plant-specific and generic data. As discussed previously, plant-
specific data are suitable for reliability studies of each plant, because it reflects the
conditions specific to each plant. Therefore, at a given level of statistical quality, plant-
specific data should be given priority in reliability analyses and generic data should be
applied when reliable plant-specific data are not obtained. A standard method for failure
data analysis consists of the following six steps:
STEP 1 Definition of failure data needs
STEP 2 Acquisition of plant-specific and generic data
STEP 3 Classification of failure data
STEP 4 Estimation of failure data
STEP 5 Survey of publications
STEP 6 Finalization of data set
3.3.1. STEP 1 - Definition of Failure Data Needs
In this step an analyst defines the data requirements. Judging from the quantitative
model, the analyst must decide upon (1) the system components of interest (e.g., control
rod drive pump, main steam isolation valve), (2) the failure type of interest (e.g.,
hardware), and (3) the applicable failure mode (e.g. failure to start). Table 3.2. illustrates
an example of typical data requirements.
3.3.2. STEP 2 - Acquisition of Plant-Specific and Generic Data
In this step, the analyst identifies and reviews the available data sources for the
plant-specific data base. Unfortunately, some utilities do not keep records for the specific
purpose of reliability analysis. Potential data sources include periodic surveillance reports,
maintenance reports, surveillance procedures and control-room logs as summarized in
Table 3.2.
Table 3.2. Example of Typical Data Requirements and Potential Data Sources 21
Parameter Data Requirements Potential sources
Probability of failure (a) Number of failures Surveillance/maintenance report,
upon demand control room log
(b) Number of demand Surveillance/maintenance report,
Surveillance procedure, operating
procedure, control room log
Standby time-related (a) Number of failures Surveillance/maintenance report,
failure rate control room log
(b) Time in standby Control room log
Operational failure rate (a) Number of failures Surveillance/maintenance report,
control room log
(b) Time in operation Surveillance report, surveillance
procedure, control room log
Human error probability (a) Number of human Surveillance/maintenance report,
errors control room log
(b) Number of successful Surveillance/maintenance report,
human actions control room log, operating
procedure, surveillance procedure
Ideally the reliability study uses statistically sufficient number of plant-specific data,
because that would be an accurate representation of the plant. In case favorable plant-
specific data cannot be taken from the operational history due to scarcity or unavailability,
the generic data source presented in Section 3.3.3. (Reliability data bank) can be applied.
Failure data taken from reliability data bank such as NPRDS are usually unrefined.
Therefore, both plant-specific and generic unrefined failure data must be processed
according to the following steps.
3.3.3. STEP 3 - Classification of Failure Data
In this step, the data collected in the preceding step are classified and evaluated.
Doing this involves two activities: the classifications by failure cause and by failure mode.
These classifications are performed for each component as follows:
(1) Classification by failure cause
First, failure causes are segregated into one of seven categories: design failure,
procedural error, manufacturing defect, initial installation failure, operational human error,
maintenance/surveillance human error and hardware failure. In addition, failure causes of
the hardware failures are segregated into two categories: use-related failure and time-related
failure. Therefore, in total, failure causes are segregated into eight categories.
The definitions of these failure causes are as follows. 22
Design Failure
This type of failure is attributable to the inadequate design of the component or
other engineering activities such as the incorrect calculation of setpoints and
misapplication of the component's intended use.
Procedural Error
This type of failure is attributable to an incorrect or inadequate written procedure.
This category includes failures attributable to incorrectly specified setpoints and
acceptable performance criteria.
Manufacturing Defect
This type of failure is attributable to inadequate component assembly or poor initial
quality of the component.
Initial Installation Failure
This type of failure is caused by improper initial installation of the equipment. This
category applies to original (first-time) installation of components (plant
construction, plant modifications) and not reinstallation (after maintenance, for
example).
Operational Human Error
This type of failure is caused by personnel action while operating the component,
including failure to follow operating procedures properly.
Maintenance/ Surveillance Human Error
This type of failure results from improper maintenance/surveillance or personnel
errors that occur during maintenance/surveillance activities on the component,
including failure to follow procedures.
Hardware Failure
This type of failure is attributable to the degradation of the component.
Use-related Failure
This type of failure results from the degradation associated with the use of the
component. The use of the component includes the operation of the component and
the operability surveillance of a standby component.
Standby Time-related Failure
This type of failure results from the degradation developed during standby time.
This failure cause is applicable only to the standby component.
Design failure, procedural error, manufacturing defect and initial installation may be
insignificant long after the installation of a component. A hardware failure of a standby
component can be either use-related, standby time-related, or both. It is often difficult to
distinguish these two failure causes of a standby component.
(2) Classification by failure mode
Next, the failure data categorized into use-related failure and standby time-related
failure are classified into two failure modes: failure upon demand and failure during
operation.
The definitions of these failure causes are as follows.
Failure Upon Demand
This mode of failure is revealed upon demand for the service by the component,
and is applicable only to the standby components.
Failure During Operation
This mode of failure is revealed during the operation of the component, and is
applicable to both the running and standby components.
Both failure upon demand and failure during operation can have several failure
modes. In this case, failure data can be further categorized into subdivided failure modes.
For example, the Emergency Diesel Generator can have two modes of failure associated
with failure during operation: failure to run and failure to stop. The failure data
classification method discussed in this section is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1. Classification of Failure Data
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3.3.4. STEP 4 - Estimation of Failure Data
In this step, the analyst takes the data from STEP 3 and, for each component,
calculates the required parameter for each failure mode. Basically there are two sorts of
outputs from the failure data: failure rate and failure probability. Since a standby
component failure can be either use-related or standby time-related, both approaches are
possible. However, as stated previously, it is often difficult to distinguish between use-
related failures and standby time-related failures of a standby component.
The equations used to determine the point estimates of these parameters are
discussed below. Due to limitations in the sample sizes the following quantities can be
estimated only approximately. However, these estimations are the best possible given the
available information. The point estimates are taken as the maximum likelihood estimates
of the mean values of the underlying probability distributions for the parameters.
(1) Failure probability
The failure probability can be approximated as the ratio of the number of failures to
the total number of attempts. Therefore, the estimated failure probability, p, is expressed
as
Nfp= , (3.1)
Ns + Nf
where Ns is the number of successes and Nf is the number of failures. Failure data
analysts often encounter the situation of an absence of the number of successes, which is
essential for the evaluation of failure probability. The unit of failure probability is
dimensionless. Important examples of failure probability for reliability analysis are
discussed below.
* Demand failure probability
The demand failure probability, Qd, is defined as
Qd = fdu/D, (3.2)
where fdu is the number of demand failures resulting from the degradation associated
with the use of the component, and D is the total number of demands on the
component.
Maintenance/surveillance failure probability
The maintenance/surveillance failure probability, Qh, is defined as
Qh = fmh/Nm, (3.3)
where fmh is the number of maintenance/surveillance failures due to human error, and
Nm is the number of maintenance/surveillances performed.
(2) Failure rate
The failure rate is the ratio of the number of failures to the total amount of elapsed
time. Therefore the failure rate, X, is expressed as
X = f/Z, (3.4)
where f is the number of failures of interest and Z is the total amount of elapsed
time over which these failures occurred. A difficulty often encountered is the unavailability
of actual operating time or standby time of the component. In this case, a probability
estimate cannot be made. The unit of failure rate is usually hr-1. Important examples of
failure rates are given below.
* Demand failure rate
The demand failure rate, Xd, is defined as
Xd = fds/Zs, (3.5)
where fds is the number of demand failures resulting from the degradation
developed during standby time, and Zs is the total amount of time the component is
in standby.
* Operational failure rate
The operational failure rate, Xo, is defined as
Xo = fo/Zo, (3.6)
where fo is the number of failures while operating and Zo is the total amount of time
the component operates.
* Operational human error rate
The operational human error rate, Xh, is defined as
Xh = foh/Zo, (3.7)
where foh is the number of failures committed by human error during operation and
Zo is the total amount of time the component operates.
3.3.5. STEP 5 - Survey of Publications
If unrefined failure data of a certain component cannot be taken from either plant-
specific operational history or the reliability data bank, the publications presented in Section
3.2.2. are applied. Since, in most studies, the failure rates/probabilities have been already
estimated, we can apply these estimated values without further processing. As discussed
before, since the failure data derived from those publications are old, the analyst may
overlook new failure modes of the component or current technological advancements,
which may lead to inaccurate reliability analysis.
3.3.6. STEP 6 - Finalization of Data Set
In this step, the data analyst finalizes the data set which is to be used in the
reliability analysis from the plant-specific operational histories, publications, and reliability
data banks.
3.4. Common Cause Failures
In the preparation of the system models, failures of components are assumed to be
random and independent. Common cause failures are defined as events in which the
probability of each failure is dependent on the occurrence of other failures. Common cause
failures may result in immediate or delayed failures of more than two similar components.
If common cause failures are immediately coupled to redundant equipment, the effect may
be devastating because a single support system failure may disable a highly redundant
system, and a supposedly highly reliable system will fail. Therefore common cause
failures are important in reliability analysis and must be given adequate attention in order to
avoid overestimation of reliability.
3.4.1. Categorization of Common Cause Failures
According to Modarres 19, the dependence among various events (e.g., failure
events of two items) is due to either the internal environment or external environment of
these systems. The internal aspects can be divided into three categories: internal
challenges, intersystem dependencies, and intercomponent dependencies. The external
aspects are natural or human-made environmental events that make failure dependent. For
example, the failure rates for items exposed to extreme heat, earthquakes, moisture, and
flood will increase. The intersystem and intercomponent dependencies can be categorized
into four broad categories: functional, shared equipment, physical and human caused
dependencies. The major causes of dependence among sets of systems or components are
described in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3. Types of Dependent Events 19
Dependent
Event Type
Internal
External
Dependent
Event Category
1. Challenge
2. Intersystem
3. Intercomponent
Subcategory Description or Example
Internal Transients or deviations from the
normal operating environment introduce a
challenge to a number of items
Power to several independent systems is
from the same source.
The same equipment, e.g. a valve, is shared
between otherwise independent systems
An extreme environment (e.g. high
temperature) causes dependencies between
independent systems.
Operator error causes failure of two or more
independent systems
A component in a system malfunctions
Two independent trains in a hydraulic
system share the same common header
Same as system dependency above
Design errors in redundant pump controls
cause dependency in a system
Earthquake or fire fails a number of
independent systems or components.
1. Functional
2. Shared
equipment
3. Physical
4. Human
1. Functional
2. Shared
equipment
3. Physical
4. Human
3.4.2. Quantification of Common Cause Failures
Common cause events for two similar components can be quantified most simply in
terms of a "beta" factor. The beta factor can be associated with that fraction of the
component failure rate that is due to common cause events, which is shared by the other
components in the system. The beta factor, 3, is defined as
= , (3.8)Ac + Ii
where Xc = failure rate due to common cause failures, and
M = failure rate due to independent failures.
Eq. (3.8) can be easily transformed as
1Ac + Ai = 1i . (3.9)
1-0
This equation represents the actual failure rate which must be accounted for
reliability analysis to minimize the overestimation of reliability.
This method implies that some portion of the actual or potential failures observed in
individual components represent a mechanism which acts on all redundant components
simultaneously. It should be noted that although this approach can be applicable with some
degree of accuracy for two component redundancy, the results tend to be conservative for
higher levels of redundancy, such as those involving three or four components. However,
because of its simplicity, the beta factor has been extensively utilized in risk and reliability
analyses. Though more elaborate methods for treating common cause failures have been
developed 19 , we have decided not to apply them here because of the absence of supporting
data.
3.4.3. Data source of Common Cause Failures
The following reports are useful data sources of common cause beta factors.
* Common Cause Fault Rates for Pumps (NUREG/CR-2098, 1983) 23
* Common Cause Fault Rates for Valves (NUREG/CR-2770, 1983) 24
* Common Cause Fault Rates for Diesel Generators (NUREG/CR-2099, 1982) 25
These reports present the common cause failure rate based upon the licensee event
reports of the corresponding components. The sample populations of the licensee event
reports are 837 for the pumps, 600 for the valves, and 369 for the diesel generators.
Common cause beta factor values taken from these publications are shown in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4. Common Cause Beta Factor Values
Component Failure Mode Beta Factor Source
Motor Driven Pump Failure to start 0.06 NUREG/CR-2098 23
Standby Pumps Failure to operate 0.04 NUREG/CR-2098 23
Motor Driven Valve Failure to operate 0.05 NUREG/CR-2770 24
Check Valve Failure to operate 0.06 NUREG/CR-2770 24
Internal leakage 0.10 NUREG/CR-2770 24
Relief Valve Failure to operate 0.13 NUREG/CR-2770 24
Internal leakage 0.50 NUREG/CR-2770 24
Diesel Generator Failure to start 0.08 NUREG/CR-2099 25
Failure to run 0.07 NUREG/CR-2099 25
3.5. Age Dependent Failures
Thus far, the failure rate has been treated as a constant value at all component ages.
In this section, the aging effect upon the component failure rate is considered, because the
component failure rate can be a function of age and can change as the component age
increases.
When age dependence is taken into account, the component failure rate is often
thought to follow the so-called bathtub curve as shown in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2. Typical Bathtub Curve
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Generally, a bathtub curve can be divided into three regions. At the burn-in region,
the failure rate will decrease, characterized by decreasing early failures such as design
failure, procedural error, manufacturing defect and initial installation failure, when they are
found. At the constant failure region, the failure rate stays reasonably constant,
characterized by random failures of components. In this period, many mechanisms of
failures due to physical, chemical, and nuclear phenomena give birth to a steady state
failure behavior. Finally, at the wear-out region, the failure rate of the component
increases, characterized mainly by the complex phenomena of the aging process. Here, the
component deteriorates due to accumulated stress and fatigue and becomes more vulnerable
to external shock. The lengths of these three periods of the bathtub curve depend on the
kinds of components and the environment where they are placed.
One interesting observation made by Modarres is that the shapes of bathtub curves
are different between electrical devices and mechanical devices as shown in Figure 3.3. and
3.4.19
Figure 3.3. Bathtub Curve for Typical Electrical Devices 19
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Figure 3.4. Bathtub Curve for Typical Mechanical Devices 19
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Electrical devices evidently exhibit a relatively much longer constant region.
Some other examples of aging behavior are illustrated in Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5. Different Types of Aging
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It is important to know that the concept of aging is related to age not to time. The
difference between age and time is that age generally incorporates the effect of the
surveillance, maintenance, and replacement of the subcomponent or the whole component,
while time does not. The age of a component does not proceed at the same speed as that of
actual time.
When the whole component is replaced, the age of the component starts over again
from a value of zero, however time does not. In the case of the replacement of specific
subcomponents, the age of the component takes a partially restored value, however time
stays unchanged. Preventive maintenance actions, such as lubricating bearings, will not
change the age of the component since subcomponents are not replaced, but will slow the
aging process of the component. Therefore, the component failure rate versus time does
not show an aging effect while the failure rate versus the component age can show it.
These differences are important to understand since confusion about age versus time can
result in statements being made that components are not aging when indeed they are. This
confusion can furthermore result in incorrect data analysis26.
However, in fact, determining the component age is a challenging task, because of
the scarcity of supporting data. Since environmental factors strongly affect the aging
process of a component, we suggest that the aging analysis be performed using plant-
specific rather than generic data. At some power plants, an analyst cannot easily retrieve
the essential inputs for determining the component age, such as maintenance history,
because they are not stored properly. Even if we have a complete set of these essential
inputs, since the effects of the rejuvenation of the component by the replacement of the
subcomponents and the delay of the component aging by the preventive maintenance are
difficult to quantify, the age of the component is difficult to calculate. However, the
conceptual difference between time and age remains an important consideration in
evaluating a component's condition.
Moreover, a great deal of failure data on a single component is required to
determine the aging rate as well as aging behavior explained in Figure 3.2. and Figure 3.5.
Usually the data analyst cannot find enough failures of a single component at the same unit
to verify the aging rate or the behavior of the component as well as a perfect maintenance
history since its initial installation.
A subjective aging failure rate data base is developed in NUREG/CR-5248 26. This
aging failure rate data base is often called the TIRGALEX data base in reference to the
committee which had oversight of the work. The TIRGALEX aging rate data base
assumes a linear aging failure rate model in the form of
X(w) = ko + aw, (3.10)
where X(w) is the age dependent failure rate as a function of the component age, w,
k0 is the underlying constant failure rate and a is the aging related failure acceleration. For
the TIRGALEX data base, a panel of experts estimated the aging rate for various classes of
components. Though no systematic estimation techniques were used, there was an attempt
to be consistent and to effectively utilize available engineering knowledge. Table 3.5.
specifies the aging rate for various components. The uncertainties associated with the
values in Table 3.5. must be taken into account.
Table 3.5. Aging-related Failure Acceleration for Various Components 26
Component Aging-related failure
acceleration
(failures/hr-yr)
AC Bus le-9
Air Operated Valve 4e-7
Battery 3e-7
Check Valve 4e-9
Circuit Breaker 2e-8
DC Bus le-9
Diesel Generator 4e-6
Fan 2e-7
Heat Exchanger le-8
Motor Driven Pump 2e-7
Motor Operated Valve 4e-6
Power Operated Relief Valve 7e-7
Relay 3e-7
Safety/Relief Valve 7e-7
Transformer 2e-9
Turbine Driven Pump 3e-6
3.6. Summary
This chapter is dedicated exclusively to failure data. First, it explores available
sources of failure data: plant-specific operational histories, publications, and reliability data
banks. Then, a method for failure data analysis is proposed. Finally, common cause
failures and age dependent failures are investigated. The available data sources for these
failures are also discussed.
Chapter 4. Example Application of Quantitative
Methodology for Surveillance Interval Extension
to Economically Important Components
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter, the methodology for the surveillance interval extension, developed
in Chapter 2 on a theoretical basis, is applied to a set of economically important PWR
components as a demonstration. The standard method for failure data analysis proposed in
Chapter 3 is also applied to actual failure data. The format of this example is proposed as a
general guide for utilities to justify the surveillance interval extension, and, perhaps
eventually, a 48-month operational cycle. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate use
of the methodology for the surveillance interval extension from an economic perspective,
and to clarify the difference between the theoretical and the practical approaches of this
methodology.
According to Chapter 2, the quantitative methodology for the surveillance interval
extension consists of the following five steps. Since this demonstration is limited to the
economically important components, the name of each step is modified to be specific to the
economically important components.
STEP 1 Establishment of economic requirement
STEP 2 Proposal of economic importance ranking
STEP 3 Survey of failure data of economically important component
STEP 4 Estimation of economic performance
STEP 5 Improvement to satisfy economic requirement.
First, the economic requirement is determined for demonstration purposes.
Second, a set of economically important components is selected from the economic
importance ranking in Chapter 2. Third, failure data of these components are analyzed
based upon the standard failure data analysis method presented in Chapter 3. Fourth, the
expected forced outage length associated with a 48-month operational cycle is calculated.
Finally, the degree to which the reliability and/or MTTR of the components should be
improved to satisfy the economic requirement is estimated. Prospective measures to
improve reliability and MTTR are discussed for each component based upon the expertise
of engineers at the example PWR plant and the plant's equipment manufacturers.
In terms of the scope of this report, a complete application of the quantitative
methodology for justifying the surveillance interval extension is an enormous task far
beyond the capability of the author. Also, note that important data inputs such as plant
type, system configuration, and failure rates of the components vary considerably from
plant to plant. Consequently, a complete application of the methodology for the
surveillance interval extension must be left to the individual utility.
4.2. STEP 1 - Establishment of Economic Requirement
In this step, the economic requirement is determined for demonstration purposes.
Since this example is performed for a set of selected components rather than for the whole
plant, the total expected forced outage length is compared with the summation of each
component's maximum forced outage length presented in Table 2.2. as a substitute
economic requirement.
For this demonstration, the economic requirement involving only n components
under examination here is set as
SFj48m • MFj, (4.1)
where Fj48m is the forced outage length due to the failures of the j-th component
during a 48-month operational cycle, MFj is the maximum allowable forced outage length
of the j-th component, and n is the number of components chosen for a demonstration.
Note that the right hand side of Eq.(4. 1) is equal to 1032 hours (i.e., 43 days) for the
whole plant analysis. In that case, Eq.(4.1) becomes the same as Eq.(2.2). For a
demonstration presented in this chapter, the right hand side of Eq.(4. 1) is a fraction of
1032 hours.
In a different way, the economic requirement is written for this limited set of
components as
n n
AF = I AF> = X(Fj48m -MFj) 5 0, (4.2)
j J
where AFJ is a gap between the expected forced outage length and the maximum
allowable forced outage length of the j-th component.
As discussed in Section 2.3.2.2., ideally, the concept of the maximum allowable
forced outage length would incorporate the individual effects of the investments in
reliability improvements of the different components. However, because of an absence of
knowledge about the benefits of specific investment effects, we assume, for purposes of
illustration, that an individual component goal can be formulated in terms of keeping the
constant relative contributions of a particular component to the total forced outage length.
4.3. STEP 2 - Proposal of Economic Importance Ranking
In this step, the economic importance ranking is proposed and a set of the
economically important components is chosen from that ranking.
The economic importance ranking proposed in Chapter 2 (Table 2.1.) is applied in
this example application. From this ranking, the following components are selected for
illustrative examination:
The Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP),
The Steam Generator (SG), and
The Main Feedwater Pump (MFP).
The rationale of the component selection includes the followings:
e These components are high on the economic importance ranking.
* Failures of the RCP, SG, and MFP are frequent as shown in the economic
importance ranking. Therefore, these components can be limiting factors in
adopting a 48-month operational cycle for many plants.
* The motor driven pump (RCP), the heat exchanger (SG) and the motor/turbine
driven pump (MFP) are adequate representative subsets of components used in a
nuclear power plant.
* All PWRs include these components and the availability of failure data for these
components is relatively good.
For this demonstration purpose, any effects of other systems/components are
neglected in terms of the forced outage length. In other words, the forced outage length of
the plant is assumed to be determined exclusively by these three components.
4.4. STEP 3 - Survey of Failure Data of Economically Important Component
Failure data are essential for estimating the expected forced outage length for a 48-
month operational cycle. In this step, failure rates of selected components are determined
based upon the standard failure data analysis method proposed in Chapter 3. The standard
failure data analysis consists of the following six steps.
SUBSTEP 3.1 Definition of failure data needs
SUBSTEP 3.2 Acquisition of plant-specific and generic data
SUBSTEP 3.3 Classification of failure data
SUBSTEP 3.4 Estimation of failure data
SUBSTEP 3.5 Survey of publications
SUBSTEP 3.6 Finalization of data set.
4.4.1. SUBSTEP 3.1 - Definition of Failure Data Needs
In this step, we define the data requirements. Since all selected components are
operating components, failures during operation are of main concern. Human error is not
addressed. Therefore, we conclude that the failure data requirements are the operational
failure rates of the RCP, SG, and MFP. In the absence of failure mode-specific repair time
data, we treat the value of the MTTR as being independent of the component's particular
failure modes. Consequently, we do not categorize operational failure data by particular
failure modes.
4.4.2. SUBSTEP 3.2 - Acquisition of Plant-Specific and Generic Data
In this step, the analyst identifies and reviews the data sources. As discussed in
Chapter 3, the best data source is a plant's operational history. However, for this
demonstration, failure data are taken from the NPRDS on an industry-wide basis rather
than on a plant-specific basis. The purpose of this chapter is to present an example
application rather than to explore plant-specific data. It is not appropriate to focus upon a
specific plant because of the sensitivity of failure data. Since the NPRDS is currently the
most comprehensive data source of both plant-specific and generic failure data, priority
should be given to use of the NPRDS.
If utilities try to apply the methodology proposed by this report, they are advised to
seek their plant-specific data based upon the methods illustrated in Chapter 3. If data
analysts encounter scarcity or unavailability of plant-specific failure data, generic data
should be applied. Whatever the data source may be, the method of failure data analysis is
the same as discussed in Section 3.3.
4.4.3. SUBSTEP 3.3 - Classification of Failure Data
In this section, the failure data of the RCP, SG, and MFP obtained from the
NPRDS are classified based upon Figure 3.1. The number of the failures of the RCP, SG,
and MFP is categorized by failure causes as shown in Table 4.1., 4.2., and 4.3.
Table 4.1. Number of Failures of RCP Taken From NPRDS20 (1/90 to 12/95)
Failure cause Total number of failures
Design Failure 4
Procedural Error 2
Manufacturing Defect 0
Initial Installation Failure 2
Operational Human Error 0
Surveillance/Maintenance Human Error 9
Operational Failures of Hardware 46
Table 4.2. Number of Failures of SG Taken From NPRDS20 (1/90 to 12/95)
Failure cause Total number of failures
Design Failure 3
Procedural Error 2
Manufacturing Defect 2
Initial Installation Failure 4
Operational Human Error 0
Surveillance/Maintenance Human Error 5
Operational Failures of Hardware 33
Table 4.3. Number of Failures of MFP Taken From NPRDS20 (1/90 to 12/95)
Failure Cause Total number of failures
Design Failure 4
Procedural Error 4
Manufacturing Defect 0
Initial Installation Failure 2
Operational Human Error 2
Surveillance/Maintenance Human Error 4
Operational Failures of Hardware 46
The definitions of failure causes are described in Section 3.3.3. The first four
failure categories may be negligible if the component has been in service for a long time.
Although our main concern is the forced outage length, in the absence of failure mode-
specific repair time data, we treat the value of the MTTR as being independent of the
component's particular failure modes. Therefore, further categorization by failure modes is
not needed.
4.4.4. SUBSTEP 3.4 - Estimation of Failure Data
In this step, the analyst calculates the required parameters, the operational failure
rates of the RCP, SG, and MFP. We apply the following equation to calculate the
operational failure rates:
Xo = fo/Zo, (3.6)
where Xo is the operational failure rate, fo is the number of failures while operating
and Zo is the total amount of time the component operates.
Since the total amount of time the component operates is not known, it is
approximated by the following equation:
(Total operational time)
= (Component population) x (Data collection period) x (Average capacity factor). (4.3)
(1) The operational failure rate of the RCP
The following parameters are needed to calculate the operational failure rates:
The number of operational failures = 46 (Table 4.1.)
Data collection period = 6 years = 72 months,
Component population = 281, and
Average capacity factor = 0.73
First, we calculate the total operational time as follows:
(Total operational time) = 281 x (6 x 365.25 x 24) x 0.73 = 1.079 x 107 (hr).
By applying Eq.(3.6), the operational failure rate of the RCP is obtained as
XRCP = 46 / 1.079 x 107 = 4.26 x 10-6(1/hr).
(2) The operational failure rate of the SG
Since the component population is 278, the estimated operational time is:
(Total operational time) = 278 x (6 x 365.25 x 24) x 0.73 = 1.067 x 107 (hr).
By applying Eq.(3.6), the operational failure rate of the SG is obtained as
XSG = 33 / 1.067 x 107 = 3.09 x 10-6(1/hr).
(3) The operational failure rate of the MFP
Since the component population is 173, the estimated operational time is:
(Total operational time) = 173 x (6 x 365.25 x 24) x 0.73 = 6.642 x 106 (hr).
By applying Eq.(3.6), the operational failure rate of the MFP is obtained as
XMFP = 46 / 6.642 x 106 = 6.93 x 10-6(1/hr).
4.4.5. SUBSTEP 3.5 - Survey of Publications
In this step, the data analyst applies the publications presented in Chapter 3 to the
component whose failure data cannot be obtained from other sources. However, since
sufficient failure data of the RCP, SG, and MFP have been obtained from the NPRDS, we
do not have to survey the publications.
4.4.6. SUBSTEP 3.6 - Finalization of Data Set
In this step, we finalize the data set which is to be used in the subsequent
quantitative analysis. A summary of the estimated failure rates of economically important
components is shown in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4. Summary of Failure Data Analysis
Component Estimated operational
failure rate (1/hr)
RCP 4.26 x 10-6
SG 3.09 x 10-6
MFP 6.93 x 10-6
4.5. STEP 4 - Estimation of Economic Performance
In this step, we estimate the expected forced outage length during a 48-month
operational cycle by using the failure rates obtained in the previous step.
4.5.1. Assumption for Estimation of Expected Forced Outage Length
The following assumptions are made in estimating the expected forced outage
length associated with the RCP, SG, and MFP.
* Failure rates are constant.
* Common cause failures and human error are not addressed.
* The number of components is four for the RCP, four for the SG and two for the
MFP, respectively.
* There is no redundancy for these components.
Again, failure rates of the components may increase from their current estimated
values when the operational duration is extended. We must take account of potential
overestimation of the component reliability incurred by the underestimation of the
component failure rates.
4.5.2. Method for Estimation of Expected Forced Outage Length
The expected forced outage length, Fj48m, is estimated as
Fi48m = MTTRj X flj48m, (2.7)
where MTTRj is the mean time to repair the j-th system/component, and nj48m is the
expected number of failures of the j-th system/component during a 48-month operational
cycle.
Since no redundancy is given in this case, the expected number of failures is
written as
ni= Nj x j x t, (2.8)
where Nj is the number of the j-th component, Xj is the failure rate of the j-th
component, and t is operational length. Therefore, Eq.(2.7) is written as
Fj48m = MTTRj X Njx 4 x t, (4.4)
where t is equal to 48 months (4 years).
Data sources are Table 2.1 for MTTR, the previous section for Nj, and Table 4.4.
for Xj, respectively.
4.5.3. Calculation of Expected Forced Outage Length
In this section, using Eq.(4.4), we estimate the expected forced outage length
arising from the RCP, SG, and MFP failures.
(1) Expected forced outage length arising from the RCP failures
Because of the following relationships:
MTTRRcP = 266.6 (hr), NRCP = 4, and XRCP = 4.26 x 10-6 (1/hr) ,
we conclude that
FRCP48m = 266.6 x 4 x 4.26 x 10-6 x (4 x 365.25 x 24) = 159.3 hr.
(2) Expected forced outage length arising from the SG failures
Because of the following relationships:
MTTRsG = 292.9 (hr), NSG = 4, and XSG = 3.09 x 10-6 (1/hr),
we conclude that
FSG48m = 292.9 x 4 x 3.09 x 10-6 x (4 x 365.25 x 24) = 126.9 hr.
(3) Expected forced outage length arising from the MFP failures
Because of the following relationships:
MTTRMFP = 93.3 (hr), NMFP = 2, and XMFP = 6.93 x 10-6 (1/hr),
we conclude that
FMFP48m = 93.3 x 2 x 6.93 x 10-6 x (4 x 365.25 x 24) = 45.3 hr.
The calculated results of AF are shown in Table 4.5. and Figure 4.1.
Table 4.5. Calculated Results of AF for Selected PWR Components
Component Expected forced Maximum Allowable Gap between
outage length for 48 forced outage length, Fj48m and MFj,
months cycle, Fj48m MFj (hr) AFj (hr)(hr)
RCP 159.3 87.9 71.4
SG 126.9 59.0 67.9
MFP 45.3 46.1 -0.8
Total 331.5 193.0 138.5
Figure 4.1. Expected Forced Outage Length and Maximum Allowable Forced
Outage Length of Economically Important Components
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Individually speaking, the expected forced outage length of the MFP satisfies the
maximum allowable forced outage length. On the other hand, the expected forced outage
lengths of the RCP and SG exceed their maximum allowable values. Upon summing
contributions, AF is estimated to be 138.5 hours. We must reduce this gap to at least a
value of zero through improvements in terms of reliability and/or the repair time of the
components.
4.6. STEP 5 - Improvement to Satisfy Economic Requirement
This section addresses the estimation of the component improvements required in
order to satisfy the economic requirement. In the theoretical approach illustrated in Section
2.3.5., the underlying assumption is that we have complete knowledge about the effects of
investments used to reduce the forced outage length. However, in reality, that knowledge
is usually difficult to obtain. This lack of the knowledge is the most significant difference
between the theoretical and the practical approaches of the quantitative methodology for the
surveillance interval extension.
As discussed in Section 2.3.5., for the important systems/components to both
economic and safety performance of the plant, the improvements of reliability can result in
the reduction of both expected forced outage length and the CDF value. However, in this
example, the RCP, SG, and MFP are assumed to be important only in terms of economic
performance of the plant. Therefore, the improvements of these components are assumed
to be independent of safety considerations.
There are two ways by which the forced outage length can be reduced. One
approach is that of reducing the expected number of failures, which is equivalent to
reducing the failure rate of components. The other is that of reducing MTTR.
4.6.1. Selection of Demonstration Cases
Because of insufficient knowledge about the effects of investments to reduce the
forced outage length, the following idealized cases are assumed in order to demonstrate
how improvements could be made systematically.
Case 1 The failure rates of the RCP and SG are reduced by the same extent.
The failure rate of the MFP and the MTTR values of all components are
not reduced.
Case 2 The MTTR values of all components are reduced by the same extent,
and all failure rates are not reduced.
As for the required reliability improvement (Case 1), the underlying assumption is
that the reliability of the MFP is much more difficult to improve than that of the RCP and
SG. Therefore, the reliability improvement addresses the RCP and SG. Note that this is a
mere assumption for an illustration purpose made without supporting data.
On the other hand, for repair time improvement (Case 2), the underlying
assumption is that there may be a strategy which can reduce the MTTRs of all these three
components. This assumption is more plausible than the assumption for Case 1.
4.6.2. Method for Estimation of Required Improvement in Economic Performance
Suppose that the failure rate and MTTR of the j-th component are reduced by
factors of sj and uj, respectively.
The improved failure rate of the j-th component, X'j, is obtained as
X'j = Xj /sj. (4.5)
The improved MTTR of the j-th component, MTTR'j, is obtained as
MTTR j = MTTRj /uj. (4.6)
By substituting these two equations into Eq. (4.4), the improved expected forced
outage length due to failures of the j-th component, F'j48m, is obtained as
F'j48m= MTTR'j x Nj x ' j x t = (MTTRj / uj)x Njx (Xj / sj)x t. (4.7)
In order to satisfy the economic requirement, the quantities sj and uj must be
determined such that the following economic requirement developed in Section 4.2. is
satisfied:
F48m < • MFi, (4.1)
I I
where MFj is the maximum allowable forced outage length of the j-th component.
Note that the right hand side of Eq.(4. 1) becomes equal to 1032 hours for the whole plant.
For a demonstration presented in this chapter, the right hand side of Eq.(4.1) is 193 hours
as shown in Table 4.5.
4.6.3. Estimation of Required Improvement in Economic Performance for Case 1
In Case 1, the MTTR values are not improved (i.e., uj is equal to unity for all j).
The reliability of the MFP is not improved (i.e., sj is equal to unity for the MFP).
In order to find the smallest values of reliability improvement factors, sj, we must
solve the following equation derived from Eq.(4. 1) and (4.7):
3 3 3
J F'i48m= X{(MTTRj uj)xNjX(j /sj) Xt}= MFi. (4.8)
i i I
The conditions for solving Eq.(4.8) are as follows : uj = s3= 1 and sl= s2. Suffixes
are assigned as follows: 1 for the RCP, 2 for the SG, and 3 for the MFP.
The sources of data needed for this calculation are as follows: Table 2.1. for
MTTRj, Section 4.5.1. for Nj, Table 4.4. for %j, 48 months for t, and Table 2.2 for MFj.
The values of s and s2 are obtained as
S1 = S2 =1.91
The results of all estimations are shown in Table 4.6. and Figure 4.2.
Table 4.6. Results of Estimation of Required Improvement in Economic
Performance for Case 1
(Reliability improvement factor= s1 = S2 = 1.91)
Compo- Expected Forced Improved expected Maximum allowable Gap between
nent outage length, forced outage forced outage length, F'j48m and MFj,
Fi48m (hr) length, F'i48m (hr) MFj (hr) AF'j (hr)
RCP 159.3 82.2 87.9 -5.7
SG 126.9 65.5 59.0 6.5
MFP 45.3 44.7 46.1 -1.4
Total 331.5 192.4 193.0 -0.6
Figure 4.2. Results of Estimation of Required Improvement in Economic
Performance for Case 1
(Reliability improvement factor=s1 = s2 = 1.91)
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We conclude that the respective failure rates of the RCP and SG must be reduced by
a factor of 1.91 in order to satisfy the economic requirement. Reduction by a factor of 1.91
is equivalent to a 47.4% reduction in failure rates, because
XL / 1.91 = 0. 526A = (1- 0. 474)X. Table 4.7. presents the current failure rates taken from
Table 4.4 and improved failure rates of the RCP, SG, and MFP.
Table 4.7. Current and Improved Failure Rates of Selected Components
Component Current failure rate Improved failure rate
(1/hr) (1/hr)
RCP 4.26 x 10-6 2.23 x 10-6
SG 3.09 x 10-6 1.62 x 10-6
MFP 6.93 x 10-6 6.93 x 10-6
4.6.4. Estimation of Required Improvement in Economic Performance for Case 2
In Case 2, the reliability of the components is not improved (i.e. sj is equal to unity
for all j). Repair times of all components are to be improved. As in Case 1, Eq.(4.7) is
solved to find the smallest repair time improvement factor.
Eventually, uj is obtained as
ul = u2 = u3 = 1.7
The results of all estimations are shown in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8. Results of Estimation of Required Improvement in Economic
Performance for Case 2
(MTTR improvement factor=ul = u2 = u3 = 1.7)
Compo- Expected Forced Improved expected Maximum allowable Gap between
nent outage length, forced outage forced outage length, F'j48m and MFj,
Fi48m (hr) length, F'i48m (hr) MFj (hr) AFj (hr)
RCP 159.3 92.4 87.9 4.5
SG 126.9 73.6 59.0 14.6
MFP 45.3 26.3 46.1 -19.8
Total 331.5 192.3 193.0 -0.7
Figure 4.3. Results of Estimation of Required Improvement in Economic
Performance for Case 2
(MTTR improvement factor=ul = u2 = u3 = 1.7)
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We conclude that the MTTR values of the RCP, SG, and MFP must be reduced by
a factor of 1.7 in order to satisfy the economic requirement. Reduction by a factor of 1.7 is
equivalent to a 41.2% reduction in MTTRs, because X / 1.70 = 0.5881 = (1- 0.412)X.
-r
Table 4.9. presents the current MTTR taken from Table 2.1 and improved MTTR of the
RCP, SG, and MFP.
Table 4.9. Current and Improved MTTR of Selected Components
Component Current MTTR (hr) Improved MTTR (hr)
RCP 266.60 156.82
SG 292.90 172.29
MFP 93.30 54.88
4.7. Prospective Improvements of Reliability and Repair Time of Economically
Important Components
The previous section discusses the extent of improvement for reliability and repair
time of the economically important components needed to satisfy the economic
requirements. The next logical question is "How can we improve the reliability and/or
repair time of the components?" This section presents prospective ways of improving first,
reliability, then, the repair time. This overview is based upon the previous studies, and the
interviews with experts at the example PWR plant and the plant's equipment
manufacturers.
4.7.1. Prospective Improvements of Reliability of RCP
Prospective measures of reliability improvements of the RCP are summarized in
Table 4.10.
Table 4.10. Prospective Reliability Improvements of RCP 30
Improvement Benefits Drawbacks
Improved mechanical seal * Less susceptible to * Unverified effect by actual
cracking on a laboratory component
basis * Low effect
Acoustic monitoring * Low cost * Does not prevent failure
4.7.1.1. Improved Mechanical Seal
On a laboratory basis, an improved mechanical seal, made of tungsten carbide, has
been found to be less susceptible to cracking than conventional seals made of titanium
carbide. This is because tungsten carbide has higher thermal conductivity than titanium
carbide, and accordingly the former is freer from thermal stresses than the latter. However,
this claim has not been verified by the performance of actual RCPs. Note that other
possibly more important failure modes are left unaffected. Examples include seal wear
caused by debris. 30
4.7.1.2. Acoustic Monitoring
Acoustic sensors attached to the casing of the RCP can detect abnormal conditions.
This is a redundant monitoring of vibration monitoring. The merit of this improvement is
its relative low cost. 30
4.7.2. Prospective Improvements of Reliability of SG
Prospective means to improve the reliability of the SG are summarized in Table
4.11.
Table 4.11. Prospective Reliability Improvements of SG
Improvement Benefits Drawbacks
Tube Material * Less susceptible to stress * High cost
Improvement 31 corrosion cracking on a * Unverified effect by actual
laboratory basis SG
Water Chemistry * High effect with excellent * Installation of impurity
Improvement 31 chemistry removal system or
replacement of condenser
are expensive
Frequent Sludge Removal 32 * Medium to High Effect for * Adds work to outage work
the newer plants scope
* No effect for older plants
4.7.2.1. Tube Material Improvement
Tubes of older generation SGs are made of Inconel 600 which is susceptible to
stress corrosion cracking (SCC). Since Inconel 690 has shown better performance on a
laboratory basis, utilities with older SGs have an incentive to replace tubes with ones made
of Inconel 690. However, SCC resistance of Inconel 690 has not been verified by
inspection of actual SGs. The replacement of all tubes may involve a great deal of
investment. 31
4.7.2.2. Water Chemistry Improvement
Water chemistry plays an important role on the performance of a SG. A grave
menace to the SG tubes is chloride ions in the secondary loop. Recent PWRs have
condensate demineralizers which remove impurities in the condensate water. An important
consideration concerning condensate demineralizers is to avoid the residual hydrochloric
acid which is used to regenerate the resins. Some plants have replaced the aluminum brass
condenser tubes with titanium tubes in order to avoid condenser tube leaks and maintain the
quality of the secondary water. 31
4.7.2.3. Frequent Sludge Removal
Sludge piles sitting on the SG tube sheet can cause corrosion of the tubes. The
high concentration of chemicals in the sludge eats away the interface between the tubes and
the support plate. The sludge pile is removed every two refueling outages at newer plants.
To extend the operational cycle, utilities may need sludge cleaning every refueling outage.
Since this change in the frequency adds work to the outage work scope, the planned outage
length may be prolonged.
Older plants do sludge removal every outage. Accordingly, this option cannot be a
remedy for those plants.32
4.7.3. Prospective Improvements of MFP
The prospective improvements of the reliability of the MFP are summarized in
Table 4.12.
Table 4.12. Prospective Reliability Improvements of MFP
Improvement Benefits Drawbacks
Addition of Redundancy 32 * High effect * Very high cost
Single failure does not * No space for installation in
cause shutdown some plants
Addition of Redundancy of * High effect * Not an improvement of the
Support System 32 * Much less expensive than pump itself
adding full redundancy
Installation of On-line * Low cost * Does not prevent failures
Expert System 33
Upgrade of Turbine * Medium Effect * High cost
Governor 32 * Allows on-line repair
Installation of Roof/Cover to * Low cost * Low effect
Protect MFP From Dirt and * Not applicable to all plants
Dust 32
4.7.3.1. Addition of Redundancy
Many PWRs operated in the US do not have redundant MFPs. Although adding
redundancy can drastically improve system reliability, it involves a large investment.
Moreover, some plants do not have enough space to install another MFP. Therefore,
adding redundancy may not be an attractive option for some utilities. 32
4.7.3.2. Addition of Redundancy of Support System
Since some support systems of the MFP (e.g., thrust bearing wear detector, and the
lubricant oil pressure switch) do not have redundancy, a single failure of these
subcomponents can cause a trip of the MFP. Therefore adding redundancy of these
subcomponents can prevent the MFP trips caused by a single failure of these
subcomponents. Since addition of a support system is less expensive than the addition of
another MFP, this may be more attractive for utilities.32
4.7.3.3. Installation of On-line Expert System
Vibration is a very important parameter for diagnosing the health of the MFPs.
Some manufacturers have developed an on-line MFP expert system which consists of
proximity probes installed in the pump bearing housings to monitor vibration and
connected to computers. The expert system triggers alarms telling operators of problems
with the pump and the likely causes. Though the use of monitoring equipment will not
prevent failures, operators will know that failures are occurring and thereby can take proper
actions to minimize catastrophic failures. Costs of installation of an on-line expert system
are relatively low. 33
4.7.3.4. Upgrade of Turbine Governor
Another prospective improvement is an upgrade of the turbine governors from solid
state controllers to digital controllers. Existing feedpump-turbine governors consist of
solid state subcomponents (capacitors, resistors, relays, etc.) on circuit boards. They do
not utilize much redundancy. As a result, when a single subcomponent on a circuit board
fails, the turbine shuts down. The digital governor uses digital electronic controls and a
microprocessor integrated circuit design. It utilizes redundancy in the controllers and
enables component troubleshooting and replacement on-line, if necessary. Therefore, we
can expect the higher reliability and the shorter repair duration of the MFP by upgrading the
turbine governors. It cost utilities 0.25 million dollars to upgrade a single turbine
governors. This is a relatively expensive improvement.32
4.7.3.5. Installation of Roof/Cover to Protect MFP From Dirt and Dust
Dirt and dust can be a threat to the MFP. The MFP in some plants are not protected
from dirt and dust. Installing a roof or cover can prevent failures caused by dirt/dust and is
a relatively cheap improvement.32
4.7.4. Prospective Improvements of Repair Times
Since reduction of the repair time is often common to many kinds of components,
this section addresses improvement of repair time collectively rather than component-by
component. The prospective improvements of the repair time, identified through
interviews with the example PWR power plant staff experts, are summarized in Table 4.13.
Table 4.13. Prospective Improvements of Repair Times32
Improvement Benefits Drawbacks
On-site Storage of Parts * High effect * Cost of storage
construction
* Increased property tax
* Inventory costs
Joint Owners' Groups for * Medium effect * Small administrative cost
Maintaining Parts * Cheaper than on-site * Not applicable to
Inventory storage geographically isolated
plants
Construction of On-site * High effect * Cost of construction and
High Capability Repair repair equipment
Shop * Increased property tax
Development of Repair * High effect * Not applicable to all
Procedures components
Design for Rapid On-line * On-line repair avoids plant * Can be expensive
Repair shutdown depending upon
components
4.7.4.1. On-Site Storage of Parts
One of the reasons for long repair time is related to the repair procedure. Once a
failure occurs, the failed components or subcomponents are removed, repaired and then
reinstalled in many cases. Some parts require testing prior to reinstallation, and thereby the
repair time is prolonged.
If parts with high failure probabilities are stored on-site, the failed parts could be
replaced with new ones without repair. This measure can reduce the repair time. Of course
stocked parts requiring pretesting should be periodically tested so that they will be ready for
use at anytime. Drawbacks of on-site storage of parts is the construction cost of a storage
facility, the property tax on it, and inventory costs themselves. 32
4.7.4.2. Joint Owners' Groups for Maintaining Parts Inventory
Nuclear power plants that do not construct their own storage should consider
establishing joint owners' groups among neighboring plants. The groups can share a parts
inventory and repair equipment.
The storage facility is maintained within the framework of these groups. In terms
of reduction of repair time, joint storage is less effective than on-site storage, because a
joint storage facility is usually more distant from the site. However, the former is less
expensive than the latter. Low administrative costs would be recouped by maintaining a
common inventory of parts. Some joint owners' groups already exist. 32
4.7.4.3. Construction of On-site High Capability Repair Shop
In some nuclear power plants, the capability of an on-site repair shop is limited.
Every time that major failures of components occur, removed parts or components are
shipped to the repair shops of vendors. Depending upon the geographic location of the
plant, the time duration of shipping takes more than that of the repair itself. Since shipping
of a failed component usually takes longer than the dispatch of a repair workforce,
constructing an on-site high capability repair shop can be an effective measure to shorten
the repair time. As in the case of on-site storage, the construction costs and the associated
property tax are weaknesses of this option. 32
4.7.4.4. Development of Repair Procedures
Surprisingly, some equipment vendors do not provide utilities with disassembly,
repair, and reassembly procedures of some components. Therefore, the repair time of such
components depends on the experience of the workforce. It would be effective to develop
these procedures in order to reduce the repair time. This option is not applicable to all
components, because the vendors may have already provided these procedures for some
components. 32
4.7.4.5. Design for Rapid On-line Repair
Design changes of some components allow for on-line repair. For example, the
MFPs in some plants do not have enough isolation valves on pressure switch lines to
permit on-line repair. If enough isolation valves are installed on this line, the repair of the
pressure switch can be performed on-line. Therefore, this measure can be effective in
reducing the repair time. Depending upon the components, the costs for design changes
can vary. 32
4.8. Summary
In this chapter, the methodology for the surveillance interval extension, developed
in Chapter 2 on a theoretical basis, is applied to a set of economically important
components of PWRs as a demonstration. Although some prospective improvement means
of the reliability and the repair time of selected components are identified, sufficient
knowledge about effect of investments in improvement is needed in order to fully apply the
quantitative methodology for the surveillance interval to the actual plant.
Chapter 5. Example Application of Quantitative
Methodology for Surveillance Interval
Extension to Systems/Components Important to
Safety
5.1. Introduction
In this chapter, the methodology for the surveillance interval extension, developed
in Chapter 2 on a theoretical basis, is applied to a set of PWR systems/components
important to safety as a demonstration. The format of this example is proposed as a general
guide for utilities to justify the surveillance interval extension, and perhaps eventually, a
48-month operational cycle. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate use of the
methodology for the surveillance interval extension from a safety perspective, and to clarify
the difference between the theoretical and the practical approaches of this methodology.
According to Chapter 2, the quantitative methodology for the surveillance interval
extension consists of the following five steps. Since this demonstration is limited to the
systems/components important to safety, the name of each step is modified to be specific to
the systems/components important to safety.
STEP 1 Establishment of safety requirement
STEP 2 Proposal of safety importance ranking
STEP 3 Survey of failure data of component important to safety
STEP 4 Estimation of safety performance
STEP 5 Improvement to satisfy safety requirement.
First, the safety requirement is determined for demonstration purposes. Second, a
set of systems/components important to safety is selected from the safety importance
ranking in Chapter 2. Third, failure data of these systems/components are surveyed based
upon the PRA study. Fourth, the increase in the CDF value associated with a 48-month
operational cycle is calculated. Finally, the degree to which the reliability of the selected
component should be improved to satisfy the safety requirement is estimated. Prospective
measures to improve reliability of the selected component are discussed based upon the
expertise of engineers at the example PWR plant and the equipment manufacturer.
Again, in terms of the scope of this report, a complete application of the quantitative
methodology is an enormous task far beyond the capability of the author. Also, note that
important data inputs such as plant type, system configuration, the PRA results, and failure
rates/probabilities of the components vary considerably from plant to plant. Consequently,
a complete application of the methodology for the surveillance interval extension must be
left to the individual utility.
5.2. STEP 1 - Establishment of Safety Requirement
In this step, the safety requirement is determined for a demonstration purpose.
The safety requirement is set as
J CDFi48m 5 CDFilsm. (2.3)
i i
The quantities, CDFi48m and CDFi18m, represent the CDF value of the i-th cutset at
a 48-month and an 18-month operational cycle, respectively. Whichever
system/component may be chosen for a demonstration, the total CDF value is not allowed
to increase after the operational cycle is extended.
The safety requirement is alternately written as
ACDF = CDFi48m - CDFilsm 5 0. (5.1)
5.3. STEP 2 - Proposal of Safety Importance Ranking
In this step, the safety importance ranking is proposed and a set of the
systems/components is chosen from that ranking.
Although we have two kinds of safety importance ranking, the minimal cutset
(Table 2.3.) and initiating event frequency prioritization ranking (Table 2.4.), we select
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systems/components from the minimal cutset prioritization ranking. This because the
minimal cutset prioritization ranking is more clearly associated with systems/components
than the initiating event frequency prioritization ranking.
The following systems/components important to safety are selected from the safety
importance ranking (Table 2.3.) for an illustrative examination:
The Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG),
The Primary Pressure Relief System (PPRS), and
The Accumulator System (ACCS).
The rationale of the component selection includes the followings:
* These components are high on the safety importance ranking.
* Since the operability surveillances of the PPRS and the ACCS are not performed
on-line, these systems may increase the core damage risk when the surveillance
intervals are extended.
For this demonstration purpose, any effects of other systems/components are
neglected in terms of the contribution to the CDF value. In other words, the CDF value is
assumed to be determined exclusively by these three systems/components.
5.4. STEP 3 - Survey of Failure Data of Component Important to Safety
Failure data are essential for estimating the increase in the CDF value for a 48-
month operational cycle. In this section, the failure data are explored for selected
systems/components important to safety.
5.4.1. Failure Data Source for Systems/Components Important to Safety
For important systems/components in terms of safety, the failure data source should
be the PRA data survey. Since the safety is eventually estimated as the CDF value using
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the PRA method, the data source must be consistent with the PRA. In this example, again,
NUREG/CR-4550 7 is chosen as the data source because this report is the original data
source of the safety importance ranking (Table 2.3.). The example systems/components
important to safety, which are examined in this chapter, are all taken from the Surry nuclear
power station unit 1 based upon NUREG/CR-4550 5.
Generally speaking, where possible, plant-specific data are applied in a PRA failure
data survey, otherwise generic data are substituted. Since there is not enough operational
experience for newer plants, the substitution by generic data is effective. However, as
operational experience is accumulated, generic data should be replaced by plant-specific
data. Our safety requirement is established based upon the current estimation of the CDF
value associated with the current operational cycle. Therefore, it is worthwhile to update
the current estimation of the CDF value.
5.4.2 System Description of Systems/Components Important to Safety
Since a failure rate or a failure probability is assigned to each basic event of a PRA,
it is worthwhile to present system descriptions for better understanding of basic events.
The purpose of this section includes letting utilities know the differences in the systems
between the model plant and their plants.
5.4.2.1. System Description of EDG
The emergency diesel generator (the EDG) provides safety related components with
AC power after a reactor scram. The Surry nuclear power station has three emergency
diesel generators, EDG #1 dedicated to unit 1, EDG #2 dedicated to unit 2, and EDG #3
shared by the two units. Since each EDG has 100% capacity, the success criterion is for 1
out of 2 EDGs to be operable for unit 1. Failure of EDG # 2 will result in the inability of
common EDG #3 to supply unit 1.
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5.4.2.2. System Description of PPRS
The primary pressure relief system (the PPRS) provides protection from
overpressurization of the primary system in order to ensure that the primary coolant system
integrity is maintained. The PPRS also provides the means to reduce the pressure of the
reactor coolant system (RCS) if necessary.
The Surry PPRS is composed of three safety relief valves (SRVs) and two power
operated relief valves (PORVs). The PORVs provide RCS pressure relief at a setpoint
below the SRVs. The PORVs discharge to the pressurizer relief tank. Each PORV is
provided with a motor operated block valve. A simplified system diagram of the PPRS is
shown in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1. PPRS System Schematic Diagram
To Pressurizer Relief Tank
Pressurizer
The PORVs are automatically open on high RCS pressure or are manually opened
at the discretion of the operator. The block MOVs are normally open unless the PORVs
are leaking. The combined success criteria are:
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* For a small loss of coolant accident (a small LOCA), one PORV must open upon
demand.
* For a transient without scram, 3 SRVs or 2 SRVs and 2 PORVs must open upon
demand.
* 2 PORVs must reclose after a transient demanding PORV opening.
The operational experience of the Surry nuclear power station indicates that each
block valve is kept closed approximately 30% of the time during operation due to leaking
PORVs.
5.4.2.3. System Description of ACCS
The accumulator system (the ACCS) provides an initial influx of borated water in
order to reflood the reactor core following a large or a medium LOCA. The ACCS consists
of three tanks filled with borated water and pressurized with nitrogen. Each of the ACCs is
connected to one of the RCS cold legs by a line containing a normally open MOV and two
check valves arranged in series. The check valves serve as isolation valves during normal
reactor operation and open to empty the contents of the ACC when the RCS pressure falls
below 650 psig. A simplified system diagram is shown in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2. ACC System Schematic Diagram
From
RV
LOOP 1
Cold Leg
LOOP 2
Cold Leg
LOOP 3
Cold Leg
Success criteria are:
* For a large LOCA where a cold leg break is assumed, two ACCs associated with
intact cold legs are operable.
* For a medium LOCA, two ACCs are operable.
A Large LOCA is assumed to occur in LOOP 1 in the Surry PRA study.
5.4.3. Failure Rate/Probability and Basic Event Probability Data for
Systems/Components Important to Safety
Both failure rates and probabilities for estimating the probabilities of the basic
events are given in the PRA. In the Surry PRA study, the probabilities of the basic events
are calculated from failure probabilities and rates as follows:
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For demand failures:
Probability of the basic event = Demand failure probability.
For time-related failures during time intervals stated in hours:
Probability of the basic event = Failure rate x Time.
For time-related failures during time intervals stated in terms other
months):
(5.2)
(5.3)
than hours (e.g.,
Probability of the basic event = 1/2 x Failure rate x Time. (5.4)
5.4.3.1. Failure Rate/Probability and Basic Event Probability Data for EDG
The following thirteen events are identified as important basic events. The
important basic events are defined as the basic events which belong to minimal cutsets
above the cutoff point of 99% of the total CDF value.
Table 5.1. presents the basic event code, basic event ID, basic event description,
failure rate and basic event probability. 5 We assign a basic event code to each basic event
for convenience.
Table 5.1. Failure Rate/Probability and Basic Event Probability Data for EDG
Basic Basic Event ID Basic Event Description Failure Rate/ Basic Event
Event Probability Probability
Code (/hr: per hour
/D: per demand)
D1 OEP-DGN-FS DG fails to start 2.2 x 10-2 /D 2.2 x 10-2
D2 OEP-DGN-FS-DG01 DG #1 fails to start 2.2 x 10-2 /D 2.2 x 10-2
D3 OEP-DGN-FS-DG02 DG #2 fails to start 2.2 x 10-2 /D 2.2 x 10-2
D4 OEP-DGN-FS-DG03 DG #3 fails to start 2.2 x 10-2 /D 2.2 x 10-2
D5 OEP-DGN-FR-6HDG1 DG #1 fails to run for 6 hours 2.0 x 10-3 /hr 1.2 x 10-2
D6 OEP-DGN-FR-6HDG2 DG #2 fails to run for 6 hours 2.0 x 10-3 /hr 1.2 x 10-2
D7 OEP-DGN-FR-6HDG3 DG #3 fails to run for 6 hours 2.0 x 10-3 /hr 1.2 x 10-2
D8 OEP-DGN-FR-DG1 DG #1 fails to run for 1 hours 2.0 x 10-3 /hr 2.0 x 10-3
D9 OEP-DGN-FR-DG2 DG #2 fails to run for 1 hours 2.0 x 10-3 /hr 2.0 x 10-3
D10io OEP-DGN-FR-DG3 DG #3 fails to run for 1 hours 2.0 x 10-3 /hr 2.0 x 10-3
D11ii OEP-CRB-FT-15H3 DG #1 circuit breaker fails to close 3.0 x 10 -3 /D  3.0 x 10-3
D12 OEP-CRB-FT-15J3 DG #2 circuit breaker fails to close 3.0 x 10 -3 /D 3.0 x 10-3
D13 OEP-CRB-FT-25H3 DG #3 circuit breaker fails to close 3.0 x 10 -3 /D 3.0 x 10-3
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5.4.3.2. Failure Rate/Probability and Basic Event Probability Data for PPRS
For the PPRS, the following twelve basic events of Table 5.2. are identified as the
important basic events.5
Table 5.2. Failure Rate/Probability and Basic Event Probability Data for PPRS
Basic Basic Event ID Basic Event Description Failure Rate/ Basic Event
Event Probability Probability
Code (/hr: per hour
/D: per demand)
P1 PPS-MOV-FC-1535 Block valve 1535 shut due to 3.0 x 10-1 3.0 x 10-1
leaking PORV (Determined
from operational
experience)
P2 PPS-MOV-FC-1536 Block valve 1536 shut due to 3.0 x 10-1 3.0 x 10-1
leaking PORV (Determined
from operational
experience)
P3 PPS-MOV-FT Block valve fails to open 4.0 x 10-2 /D 4.0 x 10-2
P4 PPS-MOV-FT-1535 Block valve 1535 fails to open 4.0 x 10-2 /D 4.0 x 10-2
Ps PPS-MOV-FT-1536 Block valve 1536 fails to open 4.0 x 10-2 /D 4.0 x 10-2
P6 PPS-MOV-OO-1535 Block valve 1535 fails to shut 4.0 x 10-2 /D 4.0 x 10-2
P7 PPS-MOV-OO-1536 Block valve 1536 fails to shut 4.0 x 10-2 / D 4.0 x 10-2
P8 PPS-SOV-FT PORV PCV fails to open 1.0 x 10-3 /D 1.0 x 10-3
P9 PPS-SOV-FT-1455C PORV PCV 1455C fails to open 1.0 x 10-3 /D 1.0 x 10-3
P0I PPS-SOV-FT-1456 PORV PCV 1456 fails to open 1.0 x 10-3 /D 1.0 x 10-3
P11 PPS-SOV-OO-1455C PORV PCV 1455C fails to reclose 3.0 x 10-2 /D 3.0 x 10-2
P12 PPS-SOV-OO-1456 PORV PCV 1456 fails to reclose 3.0 x 10-2 / D  3.0 x 10-2
5.4.3.3. Failure Rate/Probability and Basic Event Probability Data for ACCS
For the ACCS, the following six basic events of Table 5.3. are identified as the
important basic events.5
107
Table 5.3. Failure Rate/Probability and Basic Event Probability Data for ACCS
Basic Basic Event ID Basic Event Description Failure Rate/ Basic Event
Event Probability Probability
Code (/hr: per hour
/D: per demand)
Al ACC-MOV-PG-1865B ACC MOV 1865B plugged 1.0 x 10-7 /hr 6.5 x 10-4
(Time: 18 months)
A2 ACC-MOV-PG-1865C ACC MOV 1865C plugged 1.0 x 10-7 /hr 6.5 x 10-4
(Time: 18 months)
A3 ACC-CKV-CV128 ACC check valve 128 fails to open 1.0 x 10-4 /D 1.0 x 10-4
A4 ACC-CKV-CV130 ACC check valve 130 fails to open 1.0 x 10-4 /D 1.0 x 10-4
A5 ACC-CKV-CV145 ACC check valve 145 fails to open 1.0 x 10-4 /D 1.0 x 10-4
A6 ACC-CKV-CV147 ACC check valve 147 fails to open 1.0 x 10-4 /D 1.0 x 10-4
5.5. STEP 4 - Estimation of Safety Performance
This section addresses the estimation of the increase in the CDF value for the
extended operational duration. The increase in the CDF value is determined exclusively by
the systems/components of interest (i.e., the EDG, PPRS, and ACCS).
5.5.1. Method for Estimation of Increase in CDF Value
According to Section 2.3.4.2., an increase in the CDF value, ACDF, is estimated
as
ACDF= f CDFilm+(1 + f)' rkg+  rk1k2- g2 +...+ •akl...kni'gni (2.16)
k kl>k2 kl>...>kni
where rk is the sum of the minimal cutset contributions containing the k-th basic
event, rkik2 is the sum of minimal cutset contributions, each containing the kl-th and the k2-
th basic events, etc., f and g are factors of change in the initiating event's frequency and the
basic events' probabilities, respectively.
5.5.2. Assumption for Estimation of Increase in CDF Value
The following assumptions are made to estimate the safety performance of the
longer operational cycle.
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(1) The longer operational cycle does not affect the frequencies of the initiating events.
In other words, the failure rates of the components triggering the initiating events are
constant.
(2) For systems/components whose operabilities are ensured on-line, there is no change
in the basic events' probabilities after the introduction of a 48-month operational
cycle.
(3) All demand failures are considered to be standby time-related with constant failure
rates.
(4) For systems/components whose surveillances cannot be performed on-line, the
surveillances are currently performed every refueling outage. Because of this
assumption and the preceding one, the probabilities of basic events associated with
systems/components whose surveillances cannot be performed on-line increase
according to an increase in the standby time, i.e., the surveillance interval.
5.5.3. Estimation of Increase in CDF Value Associated With EDG
Most utilities test the operability of EDG monthly. This surveillance can be carried
out on-line. Therefore, a change in the CDF value associated with EDG is expected to be
negligible because of assumption (2) in the preceding section.
5.5.4. Estimation of Increase in CDF Value Associated With PPRS
Since the initiating event frequency is assumed to stay unchanged, Eq.(2.17) can be
applied in order to estimate an increase in the CDF value.
ACDF= rk g + I rklk2 g2+...+ rkl...kni gn ' .  (2.17)
k kl>k2 kl>...>kni
Assumptions (3) and (4) in Section 5.5.2. facilitate estimating increases in the
probabilities of the basic events. Since all failure probabilities/rates are assumed to be time-
dependent, the ratio of the potentially maintainable basic events' probabilities between an
18-month and a 48-month operational cycle is the ratio of the operational lengths: 48/18 =
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2.67. Again, the potentially maintainable basic events represent those arising from
component failures. Therefore, the factor of change in the probabilities (g) is 1.67 for all
basic events.
Furthermore, we need estimation of risk reduction (rk, rklk2, ..., rki...kni) in order to
complete the estimation of the increase in the CDF value. Risk reduction is again the sum
of the frequencies of the minimal cutsets containing a basic event or a combination of the
basic events. Risk reductions obtained by reviewing NUREG/CR-4550 5 are presented in
Table 5.4. The calculated results obtained by Eq.(2.17) are shown in the same Table. The
event codes are shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5.4. Risk Reduction and Increase in CDF Value Associated With PPRS (The factor
of change in the probability of each basic event, g, is assumed to be equal to 1.67)
Basic Event Risk Reduction Number of Increase in CDF
Code (1/yr) Basic Events Value
Involved in the (1/yr)
Risk Reduction
P1 4.10E-7 1 6.85E-7
P2 4.10OE-7 1 6.85E-7
P3 4.21E-8 1 7.03E-8
P4 5.13E-7 1 8.56E-7
P5 1.36E-7 1 2.27E-7
P6 5.78E-8 1 9.65E-8
P7 5.78E-8 1 9.65E-8
P8 4.71E-9 1 7.87E-9
P9 1.07E-8 1 1.79E-8
Plo 1.07E-8 1 1.79E-8
P11 1.16E-6 1 1.94E-6
P12 1.16E-6 1 1.94E-6
P1, P3 1.04E-8 2 2.90E-8
P2, P4 1.35E-7 2 3.77E-7
P2, P3 1.04E-8 2 2.90E-8
P2, P5 1.35E-7 2 3.77E-7
P6, P12 5.78E-8 2 1.61E-7
P7, P11 5.78E-8 2 1.61E-7
P1, P2, P3 2.13E-8 3 9.92E-8
P1, P2, P4 2.42E-7 3 1.13E-6
P1, P4, P9 8.08E-10 3 3.76E-9
P2, P5, P10 8.08E-10 3 3.76E-9
Total 9.01E-6
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An increase in the CDF value due to the increases in the probabilities of the PPRS
basic events is estimated to be 9.01 x 10-6 (1/year).
5.5.5. Estimation of Increase in CDF Value Associated With ACCS
The same approach presented in the previous section is applied to the estimation of
the increase in the CDF value by the ACCS. The results are shown in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5. Risk Reduction and Increase in CDF Value Associated With ACCS (The factor
of change in the probability of each basic event, g, is assumed to be equal to 1.67)
Basic Event Risk Reduction Number of Increase in CDF
Code (1/yr) Basic Events Value
Involved in the (l/yr)
Risk Reduction
Al 3.25E-7 1 5.43E-7
A2 3.25E-7 1 5.43E-7
A3 5.00E-8 1 8.35E-8
A4 5.OOE-8 1 8.35E-8
A5 5.00E-8 1 8.35E-8
A6 5.00E-8 1 8.35E-8
Total 1.42E-6
In this case, there is no joint risk reduction. The increase in the CDF value is
estimated to be 1.42 x 10-6 (l/yr).
5.5.6. Estimation of Overall Effects Upon CDF Value
Table 5.6. illustrates the summary of the safety effect estimation.
Table 5.6. Summary of Increase in CDF Value
System/component Increase in the CDF Value
(1/year)
EDG 0
PPRS 9.01E-6
ACCS 1.42E-6
Total 1.04E-5
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Since the original estimated value of the CDF associated with an 18-month
operational cycle is 4.0 x 10-5 per year, the total increase in the CDF value (1.04 x 10-5 per
year) corresponds to 26% of the original estimated value. We must offset this increase in
the CDF value through improvement of the reliability of the plant's systems/components.
5.6. STEP 5 - Improvement to Satisfy Safety Requirement
This step addresses the estimation of the required improvement of important
systems/components to satisfy the safety requirement.
In the theoretical approach illustrated in Section 2.3.5., the underlying assumption
is that we have complete knowledge about the effects of investments needed to reduce the
value of the CDF. However, again, in fact, such knowledge is usually difficult to obtain.
Therefore, an idealized case is assumed as in Chapter 4.
As discussed in Section 2.3.5., for the important systems/components to both
economic and safety performance of the plant, some improvements of reliability can result
in the reduction of both forced outage length and the CDF value. However, in this
example, the EDG, PPRS, and ACCS are assumed to be important only in terms of the
safety performance of the plant. Therefore, the improvements of the EDG, PPRS, and
ACCS are assumed to be independent of those of the economically important components.
There are two ways by which the value of the CDF can be reduced. One approach
is that of reducing the frequencies of the initiating events. The other is that of reducing the
probabilities of the basic events. For purposes of illustration, this section focuses
exclusively upon the latter approach.
5.6.1, Selection of Demonstration Case
Because of insufficient knowledge about the effects of investments intended to
reduce the CDF value, the following idealized case is assumed.
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Only the probabilities of basic events associated with EDG are improved to satisfy
the safety requirement.
The example given in this chapter assumes that only the PPRS and ACCS increase
the value of the CDF. However, in the case of the whole plant analysis, a larger increase in
the CDF value is expected because of contributions by other systems/components which
are not considered in the analysis shown in this chapter. As the safety importance ranking
shows, the EDG is the most important component in terms of safety. Although the EDG is
not assumed to increase the CDF value of a 48-month operational cycle, because of its large
risk contribution, the EDG presents unique opportunities for reducing the CDF value in
order to compensate for increases experienced with other systems/components.
5.6.2. Method for Estimation of Required Improvement in Safety Performance
Now that the areas of potential safety improvement have been identified, we
examine how to estimate the improvements which must be achieved to satisfy the safety
requirement.
Eq.(2.17) is applicable to the estimation of safety improvement.
ACDF= rk .g+ rklk2.g 2+...+ ~Tkl...kni.gn . (2.17)
k kl>k2 kl>...>kni
If the absolute value of the factor of change in the probabilities of the basic events,
g, is very small compared to unity, the second term and the subsequent terms on the right
hand side are negligible. An important assumption based upon the absence of better
information is that the quantity, g, holds the same value for all basic events. To put it
differently, the extent of required improvements is assumed to be identical for all basic
events. Then, Eq.(2.17) may be approximated by the following simple equation:
ACDF = g. rk . (5.5)
k
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Note that the absolute value of the quantity, g, is larger than unity in the estimation
of the increase in the CDF value as presented in Sections 5.5.4. and 5.5.5. Accordingly,
this approximation is not applicable to that situation.
Since the new probabilities of basic events are equal to (1+g) times the original
probabilities, the quantity, g, should be negative in order for an improvement to be
achieved.
5.6.3. Estimation of Required Improvement in Safety Performance
Review of the report NUREG/CR-4550 5 results in the following risk reduction list
for the EDG. The event codes are taken from Table 5.1.
Table 5.7. Risk Reduction of EDG
Since the increase in the CDF value caused by the PPRS and ACCS is 1.04 x 10-6
per year (Table 5.6.), then ACDF in Eq.(5.5) arising from the EDG must be equal to or
less than -1.04 x 10-6 per year. Eq.(5.5) is now written as
-1.04 x 10-6 > g x 3.22 x 10-5, or
114
Basic Event Risk Reduction
Code ri, (1/yr)
D1 4.88E-6
D2 8.22E-6
D3 4.38E-6
D4 4.38E-6
D5 4.08E-6
D6 2.09E-6
D7 2.32E-6
D8 1.02E-7
D9 5.13E-8
Dio 5.06E-8
Dii 1.06E-6
D12 5.65E-7
D13 2.46E-8
Total, rk 3.22E-5
k
.'. g <-0.032 .
Thus we conclude that the probabilities of the basic events associated with the EDG
must be improved by at least 3.2% in order to fulfill the safety requirement. Because of the
EDG's dominant importance, only a 3.2% reduction in the failure probability/rate of EDG
is significant enough to offset increases in the CDF value caused by the PPRS and ACCS.
5.7. Prospective Improvements of Reliability of EDG
The previous section discusses the extent of improvement for reliability of the EDG
needed to satisfy the safety requirement. The next logical question is "How can we
improve the reliability of the EDG?" This section presents prospective ways of improving
the reliability of the EDG. This overview is based upon the interviews with experts at the
example PWR plant and the manufacturer of the EDG. Note that, although the example
application for the surveillance interval extension methodology was performed for the
Surry nuclear power station in this chapter, the following information is based upon the
interviews of an expert at a different nuclear power station. The summary is shown in
Table 5.8.
Table 5.8. Prospective Improvements of Reliability of EDG
Improvement Benefits Drawbacks
Addition of Redundancy 32 * High effect * Extremely high cost
Automatic Rotation of the * High effect upon * Unverified new technology
Crank Shaft 33 preventing failures to start
* Medium cost
Complete Engine * Can predict engine failures * Very high cost
Monitoring System 32  by degrading trends
Specific Engine Monitoring * Can predict engine failures * Needs enough operational
System 32 by degrading trends history to specify
* Much lower cost than weakness
complete monitoring
* Adoption of portable
monitoring system can
reduce cost further
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5.7.1. Addition of Redundancy
Because of its importance, most nuclear power plants in the US have redundant
EDGs. The degree of redundancy depends on the plant. The least degree of redundancy is
one. In this case, the success criterion of the EDG is 1 out of 2 EDGs being available. If
one of the EDGs is common to the other units, a failure of a single EDG reduces the degree
of redundancy of all units to zero. The plants with such a system configuration may want
to add another common EDG. However, this may be difficult option for utilities to take,
because it costs utilities about 12 million dollars to install another EDG. 32
5.7.2. Automatic Rotation of Crank Shaft
While an EDG is in standby status, the crank shaft is supplied with lubricating oil
intermittently (15 minutes per hour). Since the crank shaft stands still during standby and
there is no clearance between the shaft and the bearing, lubricating oil cannot spread onto
the surface of shaft contacting the bearing. This lack of coverage by lubricating oil can
cause a failure to start the EDG.
Recently, an automatic rotation system was developed to resolve this problem. By
attaching a motor to the crank shaft and rotating the shaft very slowly at about one rpm,
lubricating oil can extend to all surfaces of the shaft. Thereby, the frequencies of start-up
failures of the EDGs are reduced. 33
5.7.3. Complete Engine Monitoring System
A complete monitoring system is a monitoring system with which all important
parameters needed to diagnose the health of the EDG (temperature of bearing, pressure of
cylinders, vibration of cylinder, etc.) can be surveyed while the EDG is operating. Data
may be collected automatically using an on-line data storage system. Stored data are useful
for obtaining degrading trends of subcomponents. With knowledge of these degrading
trends, engine failures can be predicted and thereby the operators can take measures to
116
mitigate failures. Due to its extensive coverage of monitoring parameters, this system is
expensive (2.5 million dollars per DG). 32
5.7.4. Specific Engine Monitoring System
A specific monitoring system is a partial monitoring system whose targets are
subcomponents having high failure probabilities. Prospective targets decided by past
operational history are cylinder inlet/exhaust valves and fuel injectors. By examining the
degrading trend of these subcomponents, the operators can take measures to mitigate
failures, as in the case of a complete monitoring system.
However, because of its selectiveness, a specific monitoring system is less
expensive than a complete monitoring system. The adoption of portable monitoring
systems can be even more economical if several units are on-site. One drawback associated
with a specific monitoring system is that the operators need enough operational experience
with the EDG to specify the subcomponents having high failure probabilities. 32
5.8. Summary
In this chapter, the methodology for the surveillance interval extension, developed
in Chapter 2 on a theoretical basis, is applied to a set of components important to safety as a
demonstration. Again, we conclude that sufficient knowledge about effects of investments
in improvement is needed in order to fully apply the quantitative methodology for the
surveillance interval to the actual plant. Moreover, we find that improvements in the
reliability of the EDG can potentially offset the increase in the CDF value incurred by other
components, because of its dominant safety importance in this example.
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Chapter 6. Summary, Conclusions, Future Work and
Implications
6.1. Summary
Chapter 2 addresses the development of the methodology for quantitatively
justifying the surveillance interval extension on a theoretical basis. It consists of the
following five steps.
STEP 1 - Establishment of economic/safety requirements
The economic requirement is a 43-day forced outage, given a 48-month operational
cycle and a 30-day planned outage. The safety requirement is that the Core Damage
Frequency (the CDF) value of a 48-month operational cycle should not exceed that of
the current operational cycle.
STEP 2 - Proposal of economic/safety importance rankings
The economic importance ranking is obtained by prioritizing the systems/components
according to the aggregate forced outage length due to component failures. The
safety importance ranking is obtained by prioritizing the components according to the
contribution of each system/component to the plant's CDF value.
STEP 3 - Survey of failure data
Failure data, essential input for quantitative analysis, are surveyed from various data
sources such as plant-specific operational histories, publications, and data banks.
For systems/components important to safety, the data source should be the plant-
specific PRA study.
STEP 4 - Estimation of economic/safety performance
Based upon the economic/safety importance rankings in STEP 2 as well as the failure
data obtained in STEP 3, the economic (i.e., the forced outage length) and safety
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(i.e., the CDF value) performance is estimated for a 48-month operational cycle
length.
STEP 5 - Improvement to satisfy economic/safety requirements
In order to satisfy the economic/safety requirements, improvements of the reliability
and repair time of systems/components are required. A standard method for guiding
investments in reduction of the forced outage length and the CDF value is proposed.
The output is the most cost-effective combination of improvements whereby the
specified economic/safety requirements are satisfied.
Chapter 3 explores exclusively various failure data, which are essential inputs for
the quantitative analysis used in the surveillance interval justification. The failure data
discussed in this chapter include hardware failure data, common cause failure data and
aging failure data. The available sources of these failure data are specified. A standard
analysis method of failure data is also proposed.
Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate the example applications of the quantitative
methodology used for rationalizing the surveillance interval extension to a set of
components. Chapter 4 focuses upon economically important components. Chapter 5
focuses upon systems/components important to safety. Prospective improvements of the
repair time and reliability of selected components are proposed based upon the interviews
with experts at the example PWR plant and the equipment manufacturers.
6.2. Conclusions
The quantitative methodology for the surveillance interval extension, developed in
this report, has been applied to a example set of components. According to this example
applications, the following conclusions are drawn.
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* Sufficient knowledge about effects of investments in improvements is needed in
order to fully apply the quantitative methodology for the surveillance interval to
the actual plant.
* Because of its dominant safety importance in the example plant, improvement in
the reliability of the EDG can potentially offset the increase in the CDF value
incurred by other components.
6.3. Future Work
This section discusses the major areas where further study is needed.
6.3.1. Optimization of Surveillance Interval
Since the relationship between the unavailability and the surveillance interval is the
U shape as shown in Fig 2.1., there should be an optimal surveillance interval for each
system/component whose surveillances can be carried out on-line. Therefore, the logical
question is "Are the current surveillance intervals optimal, under-frequent, or over-
frequent?" If the current surveillance interval is not optimal, we may be able to reduce the
CDF value by optimizing the surveillance intervals of systems/components important to
safety. This may be an attractive option because the optimization of the surveillance
interval has the potential to offset an increase in the CDF value caused by the longer
operational cycle without incurring additional capital cost.
Although some scholars have addressed this issue3 5-40, the approaches proposed
involve the following drawbacks.
(1) Most of the surveillance interval optimization models assume that a component is
not available for safety-related service during its surveillance. This is not applicable
to operability tests of several safety-important systems/components (e.g., the
EDG). The assumption that a component is available for safety-related service
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during its surveillance results in unrealistically short 'optimal' surveillance
intervals.
(2) The unavailability of sufficiently accurate failure data makes the optimization
approach proposed less attractive to utilities and regulatory bodies. Especially, use-
related and standby time-related failures of standby systems/components are often
indistinguishable. If all failures of a standby system/component are due to use-
related failures, an operability surveillance should not be given. On the other hand,
if all failures are due to time-related failures, the optimal performance interval will
be extremely short. Both of these treatments are unrealistic. Human error data are
also difficult to obtain because of the scarcity of the number of successful human
actions.
(3) Utilities are reluctant to change the surveillance interval of the systems/components
important to safety because of potential unrevealed harmful effects associated with
that change.
To make this approach more attractive, at least the first two drawbacks must be
improved. An overview of existing literatures related to the optimization of the surveillance
interval is provided in Appendix A.
6.3.2. Initiating Event Frequency
This report assumes that the frequencies of initiating events stay unchanged after
going to a 48-month operational cycle, due to the constancy of the failure rates of
components. If failure rates increase with the age of the component, the frequencies of the
initiating events may also increase and, accordingly, the CDF value will increase.
Although the frequencies of the initiating events are determined solely by the past
operational history, the mechanisms of occurrences of the initiating events are sometimes
unclear. Therefore, the effects of the extended surveillance interval upon the initiating
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event frequencies must be clarified in order to estimate a prospective increase in the CDF
value more accurately.
6.3.3. Partial Surveillance
Usually, a single system/component has several kinds of surveillances targeting
specific components and/or subcomponents. To take an example of the High Pressure
Injection System (HPI), the operability of the High Pressure Injection Pump (HPIP) may
be ensured on-line by using a test line. However, the surveillance of the injection valve of
the HPI may not be performed on-line. While surveillances for some portions of the HPI
can be performed on-line, others cannot. Therefore, a close examination of the system is
required in order to estimate a prospective increase in the CDF value associated with the
HPI. This is because the on-line surveillances are partial rather than comprehensive.
6.3.4. Forced Outage Incurred by Standby Component
In Chapter 4, all economically important components, which are selected for a
demonstration, are operating components. According to the economic importance ranking,
standby components also play important roles in determining the total forced outage length.
For example, the safety injection valves and auxiliary feedwater pump are the fifth and the
ninth ranked in the economic importance ranking (Table 2.1), respectively. Therefore,
sufficient attention must be paid to the mechanism of the forced outage incurred by the
failures of the standby components.
In order to estimate the forced outage length caused by the failures of the standby
components, the following outcomes must be modeled.
Most standby components have periodical surveillances needed to ensure their
operabilities. After passing these surveillances, they will be in standby state again. If a
failure is detected during a surveillance, the component must be repaired. If the
unavailability of the component makes the plant enter the Limiting Conditions for Operation
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(LCO) and it is not recovered within the Allowed Outage Time (AOT), the plant must be
shut down.
The failures of standby components are either use-related, standby time-related, or
both. The limiting factor in formulating the logic of this outcome is difficulty in
distinguishing these two failure causes.
6.4. Implications
This report illustrates a quantitative methodology for justifying an extension of the
surveillance interval, by which the nuclear power industry could achieve a longer
operational cycle and, eventually, a higher capacity factor. The theoretical approach has
been established. In order to apply this methodology to the whole plant, sufficient
knowledge about effects of investments in improvements and some refinements of the
methodology discussed in the previous section are needed.
Especially, the current state of failure data is not sufficient for accurate estimations
of the economic and safety performance of the plant, which is associated with a longer
operational cycle. The nuclear power industry should lay emphasis on the acquisition of
more extensive failure data such as age-dependent failure data, use-related and standby
time-related failure data of the standby components. Also further research to quantify the
improvements in the safety and economic performance which can be achieved through
additional investments need to be pursued vigorously. The substantial cost and time
required for these attempts could be recouped by the enhanced economic performance of
the nuclear power.
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Appendix A. Simple Illustration of Calculation of Increase in
CDF Value
In this appendix, the equations for the calculation of the increase in the CDF value,
presented in Section 2.3.4.2., are illustrated by using a simple case.
Assume that there are three minimal cutsets:
Cutset #1 CDFi = Ia.PA*PB.PC,
Cutset #2 CDF2 = Ia.PA.PC*PD, and
Cutset #3 CDF3 = Ia.PA.PE.PF,
where Ia is the frequency of the initiating event 'a', PA is the probability of the basic
event A, PB is the probability of the basic event B, etc.
Since the risk reduction of the basic event A, rA, is the summation of the
frequencies of cutsets containing the basic event A,
rA = Ia.PA*PB*PC + Ia.PA-PCOPD + Ia.PA.PE*PF.
If PA becomes zero, this quantity is reduced from the total CDF value. Similarly,
the risk reduction of the basic event B, rB, is
rB = Ia-PA.PB.PC.
Since the joint risk reduction of the basic events A and B, rAB, is the summation of
the frequencies of cutsets containing both basic events A and B.
rAB = Ia.PA.PB.PC.
Suppose only basic events A and B represent the failure of the component (i.e.,
only basic events A and B are potentially maintainable), the following results are obtained:
X CDFim -ni = CDF1 x 2 + CDF2 x 1 + CDF3 x 1
= 2*IaoPA.PB*PC + Ia-PA.PC.PD + Ia-PA.PE-PF, and
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, rk = rA + rB = 2.Ia.PA.PB.PC + Ia.PA.PC-PD + Ia.PA-PE-PF.
k
Note that ni is the number of potentially maintainable basic events in the i-th cutset.
These results agree with Eq.(2.12)
ICDFilsm. ni= rk. (2.12)
i k
Also,
SCDFi8sm - = CDF1 x 1= Ia°PA.PB*PC, and rAB = Ia*PA.PB°PC.
These results agree with Eq.(2.13)
CDFism - n= rklk2. (2.13)
Suppose PA and PB are a factor of (l+g) as great as the original probabilities, and
other probabilities and the initiating event frequency stay unchanged, an increase in each
CDF contribution is calculated as follows:
ACDFi = Ia.PA-PB.PC.(1+g) 2 - Ia-PA.PB.PC = Ia.PA.PB.PC.(2g+g 2),
ACDF2 = Ia.PA.PC.PD.(1+g) - Ia.PA.PC-PD = Ia.PA*.PcPD.g , and
ACDF3 = Ia.PA.PE.PF.(1+g) - Ia.PA.PE.PF = Ia.PA-PE.PF.g .
Therefore, an increase in the total CDF value is
ACDF = CDFi = Ia.PA*PB.Pc.(2g+g 2) + Ia.PA-PC.PD.g + Ia.PA.PE.PF.g
= { (Ia.PA.PB-PC + Ia.PA.PC*PD + Ia-PA.PE.PF) + Ia.PA.PB.PC }Ig + Ia.PA.PB-PC-g 2
= (rA + rB).g + rAB.g 2
This result agrees with Eq.(2.17).
ACDF= :rk g+ Irk2k g2 +...+ rk ... gn' . (2.17)
k kt>k2 k>...>k,,,
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